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Director: Camilo Rocha

Como indica el artículo 2.27 de las Directrices de Trabajo de Grado, he verificado que los estudiantes indicados arriba han implementado todas las correcciones que los Jurados del Proyecto de Grado definieron que se efectuaran, como consta en el Acta de Calificación correspondiente.



Firma de Director(a) del Proyecto de Grado

Nota de Aceptación

Aprobado por el Comité de Trabajo de Grado en cumplimiento de los requisitos exigidos por la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana para optar el título de Ingeniero de Sistemas y Computación.

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Cordial Saludo.

Por medio de la presente hago constar que he revisado el proyecto de grado “EventB2Maude: Probabilistic Modeling and Statistical Model Checking for Event-B with Probabilistic Rewrite Theories and MultiVeStA”, del estudiante de Ingeniería de Sistemas y Computación Daniel F. Osorio-Valencia (cod: 8946508), del cual soy director , y lo considero apto para ser presentado y sometido a consideración del jurado.

Atentamente,


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Cordial Saludo.

Tengo el placer de presentar ante usted el proyecto de grado titulado como “EventB2Maude: Probabilistic Modeling and Statistical Model Checking for Event-B with Probabilistic Rewrite Theories and MultiVeStA”, para ser sometido a consideración del jurado. Espero que este proyecto de grado reúna los requisitos académicos necesarios para su aprobación.

Atentamente,



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EventB2Maude: Probabilistic Modeling and Statistical Model Checking for Event-B with Probabilistic Rewrite Theories and MultiVeStA

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Abril 28 del 2023



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Abstract

Computer based systems increase every day in complexity. This tendency demands more modeling and verification features from formal methods, in order to mathematically proof properties over these systems. One of these formal methods is Event-B, which has been extended in order to cope with probabilistic behavior. In order to contribute to the verification of probabilistic Event-B models, in this work a rewriting logic semantics for probabilistic Event-B has been proposed, and it allows to encode these models as probabilistic rewrite theories in PMaude. The encoding, implemented as the EventB2Maude tool, opens the door for new statistical model checking tools like MultiVeStA to be used over probabilistic Event-B specifications. Therefore, this work presents an integration between the EventB2Maude tool and MultiVeStA. Additionally, an introductory guide for using MultiVeStA with PMaude is also given. Finally, some case studies are presented to show how the integration works and validate that the integration was done correctly, by comparing the obtained results of the simulations with their expected value.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Nowdays, computer systems are present in people's everyday life. Airplanes, cars, factories, banks or even household appliances integrate these systems in order to function correctly. Considering the influence of computer systems in our society, it is important to construct them in a rigorous manner and verify their correctness, to avoid errors or bugs that can affect negatively people's life. One way of accomplishing this goal is by using formal methods, which use mathematical models for the analysis and verification of software or hardware [1]. Formal methods provide a general structure for defining real world systems as abstract models with mathematical rigor, that can be proven to be correct and implemented as specific pieces of software or hardware.

One of the formal methods used in the software industry is Event-B. It derives from the B method [2], it is semantically based on labeled transition systems (LTS) [3] and it has been used for specifying discrete distributed systems [4]. This method, in conjunction with the Rodin platform [5], provides a framework for specifying Event-B models and proving properties over them. Some examples of the usage of Event-B in the design and verification of real world systems include the safety analysis on the CBTC system Octys of the Paris metro lines [6] and the formal development of the software for the BepiColombo space mission [7].

In order to cope with new system behaviors not considered in the original Event-B methodology, it has been extended throughout its history with new features that increase its ability to model new systems. For example, Hybrid Event-B incorporates continuous behaviors to the discrete structure of Event-B, which facilitates the specification of cyber physical systems [8].

Another example is probabilistic Event-B [9], which aims to introduce probabilistic behavior to Event-B models. The main motivation for this extension is that as systems grow in complexity, there is an increasing demand for probabilistic modeling features inside Event-B, where properties like reliability and responsiveness need to be taken into account in the formal verification of these systems [10]. Therefore, several attempts have

been made to move from standard Event-B to probabilistic Event-B. For instance, there is a fully probabilistic extension of Event-B that replaces all non-deterministic choices with probabilistic ones [10]. Other extensions try to introduce probabilistic choices by using qualitative probabilistic assignments [11] or quantitative probabilistic choice [12], instead of the non-deterministic assignments used in regular Event-B.

Furthermore, Event-B is not the only specification language where probabilistic extensions have been proposed: Maude [13] is a modeling language used to define formal models of distributed systems, based on rewriting logic [14]. A probabilistic extension of Maude, named PMaude [15], permits probabilistic modeling of concurrent systems. Paired with this extension and the query language known as QuaTEX [15], statistical model checking tools like PVeStA [16] allow to verify properties expressed as quantitative temporal formulas for PMaude specifications.

Considering the need for specification and verification of probabilistic systems, the available probabilistic extensions of Event-B, and the availability of a framework for probabilistic system specification and verification provided by PMaude and PVeStA, the authors in [17] present a rewriting logic semantics for a probabilistic extension of Event-B. This paper, provides an automated process for translating an Event-B specification into a probabilistic rewrite theory \mathcal{R}_μ , where Monte Carlo simulations can be run using the PVeStA tool, to verify properties over the model written as QuaTEX queries. The translation process is also implemented as a tool named EventB2Maude [18], which takes as input Event-B models and turns them into PMaude models that are executable using PVeStA.

Even though PVeStA can be used over the generated models by the EventB2Maude tool to do statistical model checking, for the time being it is difficult to represent and prove complex system properties of PMaude models with PVeStA. For this reason, other tools like MultiVeStA [19], which is an extension of PVeStA that provides better usability and performance, can be considered. MultiVeStA is also a statistical model checking tool, that allows to represent with great ease properties in the MultiQuaTEX query language [19] (an extension of the QuaTEX language that allows to query more measures in a single query).

Therefore, the present work has 2 motivations. The first one, is facilitating the model checking task, using the EventB2Maude tool, by extending it so the generated PMaude models can be verified using MultiVeStA . The second one, is to complement the available documentation of MultiVeStA, with a simple guide that specifies the required steps to adapt probabilistic rewrite theories specified in Maude, to work with MultiVeStA. It is expected that this work contributes to future projects that aim to do statistical model checking of PMaude specifications with MultiVeStA, or other projects that include the EventB2Maude tool.

Chapter 2

Preliminaries

The main purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical and technical background necessary to understand how the encoding from probabilistic Event-B models to probabilistic rewrite theories, presented in [17], works. Moreover, it will also allow to understand the proposed adaptations to the tool in [18], to perform simulations with MultiVeStA over the encoded Event-B models. Therefore, a short but sufficient definition of various concepts and tools, will be given. To guide the reader through the different sections of this chapter and facilitate its reading, the following section dependency is given:




Figure 2.1: Section dependencies

2.1 Event-B

Event-B [4, 20] is a formal method for specifying and verifying properties about systems based on set theory and predicate logic. Specifications in Event-B are referred to as models, and they are semantically interpreted as discrete labeled transition system or LTS [3]. The main components of an Event-B model are machines and contexts: machines contain the dynamic elements of the model, while contexts contain the static ones. Specifically,

machines contain the system variables, invariants, theorems, variant and events. On the other hand, contexts contain carrier sets, constants, axioms and theorems. Both machines and contexts have different interactions between them. A machine can “**see**” one or several contexts, meaning that the machine accesses the static elements specified in these contexts. Furthermore, machines can “**refine**” other machines, which means that if a machine M_2 refines a machine M_1 , then M_2 can use all the dynamic elements specified in M_1 and also create new ones that respect the properties defined in M_1 (for example properties defined as invariants). This relation also occurs in the same way between contexts, when one context “**extends**” another one. The idea behind extending contexts and refining machines is to add new elements and more detail to the original specifications. In terms of syntax, the general structure for contexts is depicted in Figure 2.2. The definition for each one of the elements of the syntax is:

- *context_identifier* is a string that identifies the context. The context identifier must be different to all the other identifiers of the components of the system (other machines or contexts).
- The “**extends**” clause lists all the contexts identifiers that the current context is extending.
- The “**sets**” clause takes a list of set identifiers. Each one of these set identifiers correspond to the name of one of the carrier sets of the model. A carrier set is a user defined non-empty set. The set of set identifiers of a model is defined as $\bar{s} = \{s_1 \dots s_n\}$.
- The “**constants**” clause lists all the constants of the model. The set of constants identifiers is defined as $\bar{c} = \{c_1 \dots c_n\}$.
- The “**axioms**” clause introduces the list of axioms that the model must satisfy. The Axioms are a conjunction of predicates over sets \bar{s} and constants \bar{c} defined as $A(\bar{s}, \bar{c})$. These logic predicates state the properties that the constants and sets must meet.
- The “**theorems**” clause lists some logic predicates, that must be proved within the context using the axioms. These are logic predicates defined as $T_i(\bar{s}, \bar{c})$.

```

< context_identifler >
extends
  < context_identifler_list >
sets
  < set_identifler_list >
constants
  < constant_identifler_list >
axioms
  < label >: < predicate >
  ...
theorems
  < label >: < predicate >
  ...
end

```

Figure 2.2: Context structure, taken from [4]

The general structure of the machine is specified in Figure 2.3. Each one of its components correspond to:

- *machine_identifler* is a string that identifies the machine. It must be different from all the other components identifiers.
- The “**refines**” clause contains the identifier of the machine that this machine refines.
- Clause “**sees**” lists the context that the machine is referencing. When a machine “sees” a context, it means that it can use the sets and constants defined in the context.
- The clause “**variables**” lists all the variables of the system. The set of variable identifiers is defined as $\bar{v} = \{v_1 \dots v_n\}$.
- The “**invariants**” clause lists all the invariants that the model must satisfy. Invariants are represented as a conjunction of logic predicates over variables \bar{v} , defined as $I(\bar{v})$. These invariants define the properties that the variables must hold in every configuration or state of the system.
- The “**theorems**” clause lists all the theorems. Each theorem is a logic predicates that must be proven using the axioms of the context and the invariants of the machine. They have the form $T_i(\bar{v})$.
- The “**variant**” clause is used when machines have *convergent events*. It specifies an expression $V(\bar{v})$ over the variables used for proving convergence of the model.
- The “**events**” clause lists the events of the model. Each event represents a system transition, that changes the current system state to another.

```

< machine_identifier >
refines
  < machine_identifier >
sees
  < context_identifier_list >
variables
  < variable_identifier_list >
invariants
  < label >: < predicate >
  ...
theorems
  < label >: < predicate >
  ...
variant
  < variant >
events
  < event_list >
end

```

Figure 2.3: Machine structure, taken from [4]

Events are very important components of an Event-B model and they have the following structure:

event e **any** \bar{t} **where** $G(\bar{t}, \bar{v})$ **then** $S(\bar{t}, \bar{v})$ **end**

- e is the *event_identifier*, which is a string that identifies the event.
- The “**any**” clause lists the parameters of the event. These parameters represent unknown values, conditioned by the guards of the event. The set of parameters of an event is represented by $\bar{t} = \{t_1, \dots, t_n\}$.
- The “**where**” clause contains the guards of the event. Guards are represented as a conjunction of logic predicates $G(\bar{t}, \bar{v})$ over the parameters of the event and variables of the system. These guards specify the conditions that must hold for the event to be enabled.
- The “**then**” clause contains the list of actions of the event. Actions define variable assignments that change the variable values (and thus the state of the system) when the event is executed. These actions are represented as a set of assignments $S(\bar{t}, \bar{v})$.

Event assignments can be categorized in three types:

- Deterministic assignment $x := E(\bar{t}, \bar{v})$ states that if the event is executed, then the value of variable x in the next state will be $E(\bar{t}, \bar{v})$, where E is an expression over the parameters of the event and the variables of the system.
- Non-deterministic assignment $x \in \{E_1(\bar{t}, \bar{v}) \dots E_n(\bar{t}, \bar{v})\}$ called enumerated assignment. In this case, one of the expressions E_i of the set is assigned non-deterministically to variable x , when the event is executed.
- Non-deterministic assignment $x :| Q(\bar{t}, \bar{v}, x, x')$ denoted as predicate assignment. It assigns to variable x a value denoted by x' , s.t. x' satisfies the predicate $Q(\bar{t}, \bar{v}, x, x')$.

The set of events of a model is called as *Evs*. This set includes the *INITIALISATION* event or *Init*, which assigns the initial value to all the variables of the machine and creates the initial state of the model. The initial state must be deterministic in all Event-B specifications. A whole Event-B model can be represented as a context $\mathcal{C} = (\bar{s}, \bar{c}, A(\bar{s}, \bar{c}))$ and a machine $\mathcal{M} = (\bar{v}, I(\bar{v}), V(\bar{v}), Evs, Init)$. To clarify this notation, an example of an Event-B model of a brake system, presented in [10], will be used.

Example 2.1.1 A brake system (derived from the example presented in [10]) consists of two parts: a pedal and a brake. The pedal can be *up* or *down*, and the brake can be *applied* or *released*. When the pedal is *up*, the brake is *released*. When the pedal is *down*, the brake is then *applied*. The resulting Event-B specification for such model is represented in Figure 2.4 and 2.5.

```

context ctx
sets
  pedalState brakeState
constants
  up down applied released
axioms
  @axm1 pedalState = {up, down}
  @axm2 brakeState = {applied, released}
end

```

Figure 2.4: Context of the brake example

```

machine abstract sees ctx
variables
  pedal brake
invariants
  @inv1 pedal ∈ pedalState
  @inv2 brake ∈ brakeState
events
  event INITIALISATION
  then
    @act1 pedal = up
    @act2 brake = released
  end

event PushPedal
where
  @grd1 pedal = up
then
  @act1 pedal = down
end

event ReleasePedal
where
  @grd1 pedal = down
then
  @act1 pedal = up
end

event ApplyBrake
where
  @grd1 pedal = down
  @grd2 brake = released
then
  @act1 brake = applied
end

event ReleaseBrake
where
  @grd1 pedal = up
  @grd2 brake = applied
then
  @act1 brake = released
end

```

Figure 2.5: Machine of the brake example

The context identifier for this model is *ctxBrakeSystem*, the set of set identifiers is $\bar{s} = \{pedalState, brakeState\}$ and the set of constants is $\bar{c} = \{up, down, applied, released\}$. The *pedalState* carrier set contains the possible states of the pedal (*up* or *down*) and the *brakeState* carrier set contains the possible states of the brake (*applied* or *released*). Both of these sets, are defined using the axioms *axm1* and *axm2*. Therefore, the axioms of the brake model are defined by $A(\bar{s}, \bar{c}) = axm1 \wedge axm2$. This context does not extend other components or uses theorems.

For the model’s machine, the machine identifier is *abstractBrakeSystem* and it “sees” the sets, constants and axioms in *ctxBrakeSystem*. The set of variables in the brake model is defined as $\bar{v} = \{pedal, brake\}$. The *pedal* variable represents the pedal’s state and the

brake variable represents the brake’s state. Invariants *inv1* and *inv2* define the domain for variables *pedal* and *brake* respectively, by assigning to each one of them their respective carrier set. The resulting invariant for the brake model is $I(\bar{v}) = inv1 \wedge inv2$. Each one of the events in the model represent a state transition and a system action:

- The *INITIALISATION* determines the initial state of the system. In this case, the action $S(\bar{t}, \bar{v})$ of the *INITIALISATION* event is defined by the two assignments $pedal := up$ and $brake := released$.
- The *PushPedal* event represents the action of pushing the pedal. The guard of the event $G(\bar{t}, \bar{v}) = grd1$ checks that the pedal must be *up*, to execute the action $S(\bar{t}, \bar{v}) = act1$. This action assigns the value *down* to the *pedal* variable. Conversely, the *ReleasePedal* event verifies that the *pedal* variable is *down*, and changes its value to *up* when executed.
- The *ApplyBrake* event represents the action of applying the brake. The guard of the event $G(\bar{t}, \bar{v}) = grd1 \wedge grd2$ states that the pedal must be *down* and the brake *released*, to execute the action $S(\bar{t}, \bar{v}) = act1$. This action assigns the value *applied* to the *brake* variable. On the other hand, the *ReleaseBrake* check for the opposite conditions ($pedal = up$ and $brake = applied$) and changes the value of the *brake* variable to *released*.

2.2 Non-deterministic choices in Event-B

When an Event-B model is simulated or verified, there exists the possibility of having multiple enabled transitions with also many possible parameter valuations that satisfy the guards of the event. The way Event-B resolves this multiple choice dilemma is with *non-deterministic choice* and there are three types of it:

- **Choice of enabled events:** When multiple events are enabled for execution, i.e. when multiple events satisfy their event guards, one of them is chosen non-deterministically.
- **Choice of parameter values:** In an event with parameters, it is possible to have multiple valuations for parameters \bar{t} such that the guard of the event $G_i(\bar{t}, \bar{v})$ is satisfied. Therefore, the parameter that will be used in the execution of the event is chosen non-deterministically
- **Non-Deterministic assignments:** As mentioned before, there are 3 types of event assignments: deterministic assignment, predicate assignment and enumerated assignment. Both predicate and enumerated assignments, are non-deterministic for the following reason:
 - Predicate assignment $x : | Q(\bar{t}, \bar{v}, x, x')$: states that the variable x takes the value x' , that satisfies the predicate $Q(\bar{t}, \bar{v}, x, x')$. When there are multiple

x' values that satisfy the predicate, then the new value of x is chosen non-deterministically.

- Enumerated assignment $x := \{E_1(\bar{t}, \bar{v}) \dots E_n(\bar{t}, \bar{v})\}$: states that the variable x takes the value of one of the multiple expressions $E_i(\bar{t}, \bar{v})$ in the set. The selection of which expression will be assigned, is done non-deterministically.

2.3 Probabilistic Event-B

Based on the three different forms of non-determinism explained above, probabilistic Event-B [10] introduces probabilistic choices to replace non-deterministic ones in the following way:

- **Probabilistic choice of enabled events:** To solve the non-determinism, an expression $W_{e_i}(\bar{v})$ over the variables represents the *weight* of a specific event e_i . Therefore, when multiple events are enabled, the probability of choosing one of them will be the ratio of its weight over the sum of all the weights of enabled events. This means that if there are n enabled events, then the probability of choosing event e_i is $P(e_i) = \frac{W_{e_i}(\bar{v})}{\sum_{j=1}^n W(e_j)}$
- **Probabilistic choice of parameter values:** In order to choose a parameter value probabilistically, a discrete uniform distribution can be used as a default choice to assign probabilities to the parameters. For that reason, the probability of choosing a parameter valuation is $P(t_i) = \frac{1}{n}$ where n is the number of parameter valuations that satisfy the guard of the event.
- **Predicate probabilistic assignment:** A predicate probabilistic assignment written as $x := \oplus Q(\bar{t}, \bar{v}, x, x')$ chooses the new value of x with a uniform distribution. Hence, the probability of choosing a variable value x'_i is $P(x'_i) = \frac{1}{n}$ where n is the number of variable valuations that satisfy the predicate $Q(\bar{t}, \bar{v}, x, x')$. This probabilistic assignment replaces the non-deterministic predicate assignment.
- **Enumerated probabilistic assignment:** A enumerated probabilistic assignment written as $x := E_1(\bar{t}, \bar{v})@_{p_1} \oplus \dots \oplus E_n(\bar{t}, \bar{v})@_{p_n}$ assigns a specific probability p_i to each expression E_i , where $0 < p_i \leq 1$ and $p_1 + \dots + p_n = 1$. This probabilistic assignment replaces the non-deterministic enumerated assignment.

The new structure for probabilistic events can be defined as:

$$e \hat{=} \text{weight } W(\bar{v}) \text{ any } \bar{t} \text{ where } G(\bar{t}, \bar{v}) \text{ then } S(\bar{t}, \bar{v}) \text{ end}$$

Where $W(\bar{v})$ is an expression over the variables that determines the weight of the event, \bar{t} is the set of parameters of the event, $G(\bar{t}, \bar{v})$ the guard of the event and $S(\bar{t}, \bar{v})$ is the *probabilistic action*. The probabilistic action contains only deterministic assignments, predicate probabilistic assignments and enumerated probabilistic assignments. The resulting machine for a probabilistic model is then $\mathcal{M} = (\bar{v}, I(\bar{v}), V(\bar{v}), PEvtS, Init)$ where $PEvtS$ is a

set of probabilistic events and *Init* is the initialization event (*Init* must be a deterministic event). To exemplify probabilistic Event-B, let's consider an extension of the previously explained brake model.

Example 2.3.1 This new example, taken from [10], adds new constraints:

- R1.** Pedal failure: when the driver tries to switch “down” the pedal, it may stay in the same position.
- R2.** Risk of pedal failure: the risk of pedal failure is set to 10%.
- R3.** Brake failure: the brake may not be applied, although the pedal has been switched down.
- R4.** Maximum brake wear: the brake cannot be applied more than a fixed number of times.
- R5.** Brake wear: due to brake wear, the risk of brake failure increases each time the brake is applied.

The resulting probabilistic model is depicted in Figure 2.6. This new model incorporates all of the previously defined constraints in the following way:

- Constraints **R1** and **R2** are modeled in the probabilistic event *PushPedal*, in which an enumerated probabilistic assignment is used to assign the value of variable *pedal*. This assignment $pedal := down @9/10 \oplus up @1/10$ states that when the event *PushPedal* is executed, the probability of changing its value to *down* is 90% and the probability of remaining with the value *up* is 10%.
- For **R4**, a new constant *MAX_WEAR* s.t. $MAX_WEAR \in \mathbb{N}$ and $MAX_WEAR > 1$, is introduced to the context of the model. This constant determines the maximum number of times the brake can be applied. In addition, the variable $wear \in \mathbb{N}$ tracks the number of times the brake has been used. To make sure that the number of times the brake has been applied doesn't exceeds the maximum wear, i.e. $wear < MAX_WEAR$, the weights of probabilistic events *ApplyBrake* and *ReleaseBrake* are modeled by the expression $MAX_WEAR - wear$. Therefore, when $MAX_WEAR = wear$, the weight of both events will be 0. This will make their probability of execution also 0, based on how probabilistic choice of enabled events is calculated.
- To model **R3**, a new event *ApplyBrakeFailure* is introduced. When executed, this event simulates a brake failure, by leaving the brake in state *released* when the pedal is *down*.
- Finally, the constraint **R5** is defined by the weights of event *ApplyBrake* and *ApplyBrakeFailure*. As mentioned before, the weight of event *ApplyBrake* is modeled with the expression $MAX_WEAR - wear$, and the expression for the weight of event *ApplyBrakeFailure* is $wear$. Thus, when the value of variable *wear* increases, then

the probability of executing event *ApplyBrake* decreases and the probability of *ApplyBrakeFailure* increases.




Figure 2.6: Probabilistic machine of the brake example, taken from [10]

2.4 Maude

Maude [21, 22, 23] is a high performance declarative language, that allows the specification of programs, dynamic systems or logics, and their verification. Maude’s specifications are represented as *functional modules* declared with syntax:

```

fmod MODULENAME is
  BODY
endfm

```

where *MODULENAME* is the name of the functional module, and *BODY* is a set of declarations that specify the specification. The body of the module contains *sorts* (written in Maude as `sorts`), where each sort correspond to a specific data type. It also contains a set of function symbols or function declarations called *operators* (abbreviated as `op` in Maude), that specify the constructors of the different sorts, along with the syntax of the specification’s functions. Finally, a set of *equations* (abbreviated as `eq` in Maude) is used to define the meaning of the functions. These equations use *variables* (abbreviated as `var` in Maude).

To illustrate how a Maude specification is constructed, the following code corresponds to a functional module that defines the natural numbers and the addition operation, borrowed from [22, 23]:

```

fmod NAT-ADD is
  sort Nat .

  op 0 : -> Nat [ctor] .

```

```

op s : Nat -> Nat [ctor] .
op _+_ : Nat Nat -> Nat .

vars N M : Nat .

--- Recursive Definition for addition
eq N + 0 = N .
eq N + s(M) = s(N + M) .
endfm

```

The sort `Nat` is a data type that represents the natural numbers. This sort has two constructors (represented in the code with the key word `ctor`): `0` which is a constant and the operator `s`, which takes one argument of type `Nat` and represents the successor function in the natural numbers. With these two operators, it is possible to define arithmetic functions in the natural numbers, like addition. In this case, the operation is defined inductively using 2 equations. Using this module, it is possible to compute the value for addition for two natural numbers using the command `red`. For example, if the command `red s(s(s(0))) + s(s(0))` is used (the command represents the operation $3 + 2$), the answer 5 is obtained represented as `s(s(s(s(s(0)))))`:

```

***** equation
eq N + s(M) = s(N + M) .
N --> s(s(s(0)))
M --> s(0)
s(s(s(0))) + s(s(0))
---->
s(s(s(s(0))) + s(0))
***** equation
eq N + s(M) = s(N + M) .
N --> s(s(s(0)))
M --> 0
s(s(s(0))) + s(0)
---->
s(s(s(s(0))) + 0)
***** equation
eq N + 0 = N .
N --> s(s(s(0)))
s(s(s(0))) + 0
---->
s(s(s(0)))
result Nat: s(s(s(s(s(0))))

```

Maude computes using equations from left to right. Therefore, in computation steps like the first one, the expression `s(s(s(0))) + s(s(0))` is matched with the left side of the equation `N + s(M) = s(N + M)` and matching substitution $\{N \mapsto s(s(s(0))), M \mapsto$

$s(0)$ }. The resulting expression $s(s(s(0))) + s(s(0))$, will be simplified again with the same equation, until it reduces to a simplified expression that can be matched with the equation $N + 0 = N$ (as seen in the last step).

Semantically, functional modules in Maude are *equational theories* [23, 22], that are represented as a pair (Σ, E) where:

- the *signature* Σ describes the syntax of the theory, which is the data types and operators symbols (sorts and operators).
- E is the set of equations between expressions written in the syntax of Σ .

As mentioned before, computations in Maude are done by using the equations over expressions constructed with operators. This method is called *term rewriting* [23, 22] and behaves in the following way:

- With the equations E of (Σ, E) , *term rewriting rules* are defined as $\vec{E} = \{u \rightarrow v \mid (u = v) \in E\}$.
- A term t , which are expressions formed using the syntax in Σ , is rewritten to t' in one step $t \rightarrow_{\vec{E}} t'$ if and only if, the following conditions are sufficed:
 - there is a subterm w in t , expressed as $t[w]$.
 - there is a rule $(u \rightarrow v) \in \vec{E}$ and a substitution θ s.t. : $w = u\theta$, $w' = v\theta$, $t' = t[w'] = t[v\theta]$.

As an example, taken from [23], in the previous computation $\text{red } s(s(s(0))) + s(s(0))$ the term rewriting process in the second step, is the following:

- $E = N+s(M)=s(N + M)$
- $t = s(s(s(s(0)))) + s(0)$
- $\theta = \{N \mapsto s(s(s(0))), M \mapsto 0\}$
- $w = N+s(M)\theta = s(s(s(0))) + s(0)$
- $w' = s(N+M)\theta = s(s(s(s(0)))) + 0$
- $t' = s([w']) = s(s(s(s(s(0)))) + 0)$

the resulting term rewriting is $t \rightarrow_{\vec{E}} t'$. Aside from building specifications in Maude using functional modules, it is also possible to model concurrent systems. This is done with *system modules*, which permit the construction of system states and transitions. Semantically, a system module is a *rewrite theory* [22, 24] $\mathcal{R} = (\Sigma, E, L, R)$ where:

- (Σ, E) is an equational theory.
- L is a set of labels.

- R is a set of unconditional labeled rewrite rules of the form $l : t \rightarrow t'$, and conditional labeled rewrite rules of the form $l : t \rightarrow t'$ if $cond$, where $l \in L$, t, t' are terms in Σ and $cond$ is a condition or system guard.

The syntax for system modules in Maude is:

```
mod MODULENAME is
  BODY
endm
```

Where the body represents a rewrite theory \mathcal{R} . The syntax for unconditional rewriting rules is

```
rl [l] : t => t' .
```

and for conditional rewriting rules is

```
crl [l] : t => t' if cond .
```

To exemplify this, let's consider the following simple model of a bus.

Example 2.4.1 A transport bus has capacity for 60 people. The bus can be moving or stationary, and can only drop or lift passengers when the bus is stationary. Finally, at any time, the bus driver can use the brake to stop or use the gas pedal to move. The corresponding Maude system module for this model is:

```
mod BUS is protecting NAT .
  sorts Bus Status .

  op bus : Nat Status -> Bus [ctor] .
  ops stationary moving : -> Status [ctor] .

  vars N M : Nat . var S : Status .

  --- move the bus
  rl [move] : bus(N,stationary) => bus(N,moving) .
  --- stop the bus
  rl [stop] : bus(N,moving) => bus(N,stationary) .
  --- drop passenger
  rl [drop] : bus(s(N),stationary) => bus(N,stationary) .
  --- lift passenger
  crl [lift] : bus(N,stationary) => bus(s(N),stationary)
              if s(N) <= 60 .
endm
```

In this model the states of the system are represented with instances of the sort `Bus`. They contain a natural number that represents the number of people inside the bus and a

Status, which represents the state of the bus (it can be stationary or moving). In this case, no equations are used, therefore the set of equations $E = \emptyset$ and Σ will contain the sorts Bus and Status with their respective operators. To model the different events in the model, four rewriting rules were used:

- An unconditional rule, labeled `move`, that represents the event of using the gas pedal to move the bus by changing the status from `stationary` to `moving`. Note that this rule can only be applied when the bus is `stationary`, as stated by the rule first term `bus(N, stationary)`.
- An unconditional rule, labeled `stop`, that represents the event of using the brakes to stop the bus. This changes the status of the bus from `moving` to `stationary`. As the previous rule, it can only be applied when the first term is matched, i.e. when the bus status is `moving`.
- An unconditional rule, labeled `drop`, that represents the event of dropping people off the bus. The subterm `s(N)` assures that it can only drop a person when the number of people inside the bus is one or more. This rule rewrites the state of the system, by reducing the number of passengers in the bus by one.
- A conditional rule, labeled `lift`, that represents the event of lifting a passenger. When this rule is applied, the number of passengers inside the bus is increased by one. To prevent exceeding the maximum capacity of the bus, the condition `if s(N) <= 60` is used.

With this system module, that represents a rewrite theory \mathcal{R} , the simple bus model can be verified using other functionalities in Maude like model checking with the commands `rewrite` and `search`. The `rewrite` command or `rew` takes an initial state of the system and uses the rewriting rules until termination, i.e. until no other rewriting rule can be applied to the system state. In the case of the bus example, the rules `move` and `stop` can be applied infinitely. Therefore, to be able to simulate the system, Maude also allows to use bounded rewriting. With this method, it is possible to specify the number of rewriting rules to be applied to the initial state of the system. For example, the command:

```
rew [3] bus(0, stationary) .
```

will apply 3 rewriting rules to the state `bus(0, stationary)`, which refers to a stationary bus with no passengers. The resulting execution is:

```
***** rule
rl bus(N, stationary) => bus(N, moving) [label move] .
bus(0, stationary)
--->
bus(0, moving)
***** rule
rl bus(N, moving) => bus(N, stationary) [label stop] .
```

```

bus(0, moving)
--->
bus(0, stationary)
***** rule
crl bus(N, stationary) => bus(s N, stationary)
                        if s N <= 60 = true [label lift] .
bus(0, stationary)
--->
bus(1, stationary)
result Bus: bus(1, stationary)

```

Lastly, with the search command it is possible to verify if a given state is reachable. For example, to check if the state `bus(10, stationary)` can be reached from the initial state `bus(0, moving)`, the command

```
search bus(0, stationary) =>* bus(10, moving) .
```

can be used. The result of this command is: ’

```

search in BUS : bus(0, stationary) =>* bus(10, moving) .
Solution 1 (state 21)
states: 22  rewrites: 50 in 0ms cpu (0ms real) (~ rewrites/second)
empty substitution
No more solutions.

```

If the search returns a solution, it means that the state is reachable. Furthermore, it is also possible to check if the system will exceed the maximum capacity, defining a system invariant *I* that states this property. This can be done, by adding the following code to the bus module:

```

--- Define predicates
var X : Bus .
op predicate : Bus -> Bool .
eq predicate(bus(N,S)) = if N <= 60 then true else false fi .

```

This invariant can be checked with the search command using:

```
search bus(0, stationary) =>* X s.t. predicate(X) /= true .
```

which searches for a state *X* where the bus has more than 60 passengers. The resulting execution of the command returns no solution:

```

search in BUS : bus(0, stationary) =>*
                    X such that predicate(X) /= true = true .
No solution.

```

This means that the bus system cannot exceed the maximum capacity of the bus.

2.5 Object-Based Programming in Maude

Object-based programming in Maude [21, 24, 22] is supported by a predefined module `CONFIGURATION`. This module contains the necessary sorts and syntax to define the objects, messages, system configurations and objects interactions, of an object-based system. This module is defined as:

```
mod CONFIGURATION is
  --- basic object system sorts
  sorts Object Msg Configuration .
  --- construction of configurations
  subsort Object Msg < Configuration .
  op none : -> Configuration [ctor] .
  op _ _ : Configuration Configuration -> Configuration
    [ctor config assoc comm id: none] .
```

The basic sorts are `Object`, `Msg` and `Configuration`. A term of sort `Object` represents an instance of a system object, a term of sort `Msg` represents a message shared by the system objects and a term of sort `Configuration` represents a snapshot of the current system state, represented as a multiset of objects and messages. These configurations are built with the multiset union operation (defined with syntax `_ _`) between objects, messages or other configurations, and the empty configuration is defined as `none`. The module configuration also implements a predefined syntax for object construction. They have the form:

$$\langle O : C \mid a_1 : v_1, \dots, a_n : v_n \rangle$$

Where O is the object's identifier, C is a class identifier, $a_1 \dots a_n$ are attribute identifiers and $v_1 \dots v_n$ are the values of each one of the attributes. This defined syntax in Maude is implemented as:

```
--- Maude object syntax
sorts Oid Cid .
sorts Attribute AttributeSet .
subsort Attribute < AttributeSet .
op none : -> AttributeSet [ctor] .
op _,_ : AttributeSet AttributeSet -> AttributeSet
  [ctor assoc comm id: none] .
op <_:_|_> : Oid Cid AttributeSet -> Object [ctor object] .
endm
```

Where `Oid` corresponds to the object identifier O , `Cid` is the class identifier C and the attributes of the object are represented as a multiset. Messages' syntax is defined by the

user. To understand how systems are modeled in Maude with configurations, the bank account example in [21] can be examined.

Example 2.5.1 The BANK-ACCOUNT system module is defined as:

```

mod BANK-ACCOUNT is
  protecting INT .
  protecting CONFIGURATION .
  op Account : -> Cid [ctor] .
  op bal :_ : Int -> Attribute [ctor gather (&)] .
  op from_to_transfer_ : Oid Oid Nat -> Msg [ctor] .

  vars A B : Oid .
  vars M N L : Nat .

  --- Definition of transfer rewriting rule
  crl [transfer] :
    (from A to B transfer M)
    < A : Account | bal : N >
    < B : Account | bal : L >
  => < A : Account | bal : N - M >
      < B : Account | bal : L + M >
  if N >= M .

  --- Definition of the initial configuration
  op bankConf : -> Configuration .
  ops A-001 A-002 : -> Oid .
  eq bankConf
  = < A-001 : Account | bal : 250 >
    < A-002 : Account | bal : 1250 >
    (from A-002 to A-001 transfer 300) .
endm

```

The system consists of different bank accounts, that can transfer money to each other. The `protecting` command is used to include the functional modules `INT` and `CONFIGURATION`, which include all the sorts, operators and equations defined in these modules, into the `BANK-ACCOUNT` system module. The bank account class is named as `Account`, and it contains the attribute `bal` which corresponds to the amount of money available in an account. The message `from_to_transfer_` simulates the transfer request from one account to another, by specifying the two account object identifiers or `Oid` (one for the account that sends the money and the other one for the account that receives the money) and the amount of money to be sent as an integer. The rewrite rule `transfer` matches a system configuration where the message `from A to B transfer M` and the two accounts with `Oid A` and `B` are present. After that, the rule modifies the attribute `bal` of both accounts according to the transaction parameters and erases the message from the configuration.

For example, if the initial configuration of the system is the one defined by `bankConf`, the result after using the rewriting command `rew in BANK-ACCOUNT : bankConf .` which rewrites the initial state using the rewriting rules until reaching a deadlock, would be:

```
result Configuration: < A-001 : Account | bal : 550 >
                    < A-002 : Account | bal : 950 >
```

2.6 PMaude

Probabilistic Maude or PMaude [15], is a Maude extension that introduces probabilities to the language. The underlying theory behind PMaude are *probabilistic rewrite theories* which correspond to an extension of rewrite theories. Probabilistic rewrite theories can be expressed as tuple $\mathcal{R}_p = (\Sigma, E, L, R, \pi)$, where $(\Sigma, E, L, R,)$ is a rewrite theory and π is a function that assigns to each rewrite rule $r \in R$ a probability, given the current model state or configuration. This probability will determine if a rule may or may not be executed in the following system transition. The general form of probabilistic rewrite rules, both unconditional and conditional respectively is:

$$l : t(\vec{x}) \rightarrow t'(\vec{x}, \vec{y}) \text{ if } C(\vec{x}) \text{ with probability } \vec{y} := \pi_r(\vec{y})$$

$$l' : t(\vec{x}) \rightarrow t'(\vec{x}, \vec{y}) \text{ with probability } \vec{y} := \pi_r(\vec{y})$$

Where \vec{x} is the set of variables of the model, \vec{y} is the set of new variables accessible in the following model state and $C(\vec{x})$ is the conjunction of conditions over the set \vec{x} . Moreover, l, l' are labels in L , t, t' are terms in the signature Σ and π_r corresponds to the probability function assigned to the specific rule $r \in R$.

Example 2.6.1 To exemplify this new notion, let's consider the PMaude module, presented in [15]:

```
pmod EXPONENTIAL-CLOCK is
  --- import positive real number module
  protecting POSREAL .

  --- imports PMaude module that defines
  --- EXPONENTIAL, BERNOULLI, GAMMA, etc.
  protecting PMAUDE .

  --- declare a sort Clock
  sort Clock .
  --- declare a constructor operator for Clock
  op clock : PosReal PosReal => Clock .
  --- declares a constructor operator for a broken clock
  op broken : PosReal PosReal => Clock .
```

```

--- T is used to represent time of clock,
--- C represents charge in the clocks battery,
--- t represents time increment of the clock
vars T C t : PosReal . var B : Bool .

rl [advance]: clock(T,C) =>
    if B then
        clock(T+t, C -  $\frac{C}{1000}$ )
    else
        broken(T, C -  $\frac{C}{1000}$ )
    fi
    with probability B:=BERNOULLI( $\frac{C}{1000}$ )
        and
        t:=EXPONENTIAL(1.0) .

rl [reset]: clock(T,C) => clock(0.0,C) .
endpm

```

This model represents a clock that works with a battery. The idea is to model the behavior of the clock, when the battery starts depleting: when the charge of the battery is high, then the probability that the clock breaks is low. Conversely, when the clock's battery is low, the clock has a higher probability of breaking. In this probabilistic system module, the clock is represented as a term `clock(T,C)`, where `T` is the time and `C` is the clock's battery. The main probabilistic rewrite rule `advance` represents the "ticks" of the clock. If the boolean value `B` is true, then the clock ticks normally and the new time will be the current time `T` plus an increment `t`. Also, the charge of the clock will be reduced by a thousandth of the current's clock's charge. If `B` is false, then the clock will break and move to the state `broken(T, C - $\frac{C}{1000}$)`. The constructor `broken` of sort `Clock` represents the broken state of the clock. To incorporate the probabilistic choice of event for the clock's state (either ticking or breaking), the value `B` is chosen probabilistically, based on the charge of the clock. This is done by the `BERNOULLI` function, which receives a float number and returns a boolean value that is distributed according to the Bernoulli distribution with mean $\frac{C}{1000}$. Therefore, the lesser the charge left in the battery, the greater is the probability that the clock will break. The value `t` is also probabilistically determined, in this case, by an exponential distribution function. There is also a second rewriting rule, that resets the clock to its initial state `clock(0.0, C)`. It is important to remark that this model has both probabilistic and non-deterministic choice: The state of the clock depends on a probability function but the choice of rewriting rules is done non-deterministically by Maude's fair scheduler.

PMaude modules can be transformed into regular system modules in Maude. This is done with three key modules: `COUNTER`, `RANDOM` and `SAMPLER`. The built-in `COUNTER` module in Maude consists of the rewriting rule

```
rl counter => N:Nat .
```

that rewrites the constant counter to a natural number. The module is built to guarantee that every time the constant counter is replaced with a natural number N , this natural number corresponds to the successor of the natural number obtained in the previous use of the rule. The built-in `RANDOM` module provides a random number generator function, called `random`. Lastly, the `SAMPLER` module specifies the sampling functions for different probability functions. For example, for the previous clock example, the needed functions will be:

```
op EXPONENTIAL : PosReal -> PosReal .
op BERNOULLI : PosReal -> Bool .
```

that are defined as:

```
rl EXPONENTIAL(R) => (- log(rand)) / R .
rl BERNOULLI(R) => if rand < R then true else false fi .
```

The value `rand` in both of the rules is defined as:

```
rl [rnd] : rand => float(random(counter + 1) / 4294967296) .
```

and it is rewritten in each step to a random number between 0 and 1. The number 4294967296 is used to divide the number returned by `random`, since it is the maximum number the function can return. The resulting Maude system module [15] is:

```
mod EXPONENTIAL-CLOCK-TRANSFORMED is
  --- The SAMPLER mode includes the COUNTER and RANDOM modules
  protecting SAMPLER .
  protecting POSREAL .

  sort Clock .
  op clock : Nat Float -> Clock [ctor] .
  op broken : Nat Float -> Clock [ctor] .

  vars T C : PosReal .

  rl clock(T,C) => if BERNOULLI( $\frac{C}{1000}$ ) then
                    clock(T + EXPONENTIAL(1.0), C -  $\frac{C}{1000}$ )
                  else
                    broken(T, C -  $\frac{C}{1000}$ )
                  fi .

  rl [reset]: clock(T,C) => clock(0.0,C) .
endm
```

2.7 VeStA, PVeStA, MultiVeStA, QuaTEx and MultiQuaTEx

VeStA [25] is a tool (implemented in Java) for statistical analysis of probabilistic systems. It supports statistical model checking and statistical evaluation of expected values of temporal expressions. These expressions can be constructed using the query language of *Quantitative Temporal Expression* or QuaTEx [15], and analyzed by VeStA using *Monte Carlo simulations*. The general process to use VeStA and analyze the properties of a probabilistic model, is the following:

1. Create a probabilistic system in the supported modeling languages, e.g. probabilistic rewrite theories specified in PMAude.
2. Define the model properties that are going to be analyzed using the supported temporal expressions, e.g. QuaTEx.
3. Run Monte Carlos simulations using VeStA, over the model and the defined properties, specifying the simulation parameters.
4. Get the expected value of the temporal expressions specified in step 2.

The syntax of a QuaTEx expression is defined in Figure 2.7. The reader can find an in depth explanation of this syntax and how QuaTEx queries evaluate in [15, 19]. For now we will define a QuaTEx expression as the expected value of a temporal logic predicate over state observations that returns a real number. For example the QuaTEx expression `eval E[PExp]` returns the expected value of the real number returned by the temporal logic predicate *PExp* (or also called *path expression* in the syntax of QuaTEx).

<code>Q ::= DS eval E[PExp];</code>	1
<code>DS ::= set of Defn</code>	2
<code>Defn ::= N(x₁, ..., x_m) = PExp;</code>	3
<code>SExp ::= c rval(i) F(SExp₁, ..., SExp_k) x_j</code>	4
<code>PExp ::= SExp #N(SExp₁, ..., SExp_n) </code>	5
<code> if SExp then PExp₁ else PExp₂ fi</code>	6

Figure 2.7: QuaTEx syntax, taken from [19]

Using the previous definition of QuaTEx queries, let's suppose that we want to find the expected value of a QuaTEx query `eval E[PExp]` using VeStA (we will refer to the expected value of the QuaTEx query obtained by VeStA as \hat{x} , and to the real expected value as x). To obtain \hat{x} , VeStA uses 2 user-defined parameters α and δ . With these parameters, VeStA runs n simulations, until n is large enough to obtain a *confidence interval* (CI) with probability $(1 - \alpha) * 100\%$ bounded by δ , i.e an interval $[\hat{x} - \frac{\delta}{2}, \hat{x} + \frac{\delta}{2}]$ where the probability that $x \in [\hat{x} - \frac{\delta}{2}, \hat{x} + \frac{\delta}{2}]$ is $(1 - \alpha) * 100\%$. In other words, if VeStA calculates the expected value of a QuaTEx query as \hat{x} , then the probability that the real expected value of the query (represented as x) is in the interval $[\hat{x} - \frac{\delta}{2}, \hat{x} + \frac{\delta}{2}]$, is $(1 - \alpha) * 100\%$.

VeStA and Quatex have also seen many upgrades during time. For example, the authors in [16] present an extension of VeStA called PVeStA. This tool allows to run parallelized algorithms for statistical model checking using a client-server architecture. Furthermore [19] presents an extension of both VeStA and PVeStA called MultiVeStA, that extends the QuaTEx language to MultiQuaTEx, by allowing to query more state measures at a time. This improves the usability and the performance of the language. The extension also integrates existing discrete event simulators in addition to the originally supported ones, and improves the presentation of results, by including graphs of the results of the simulations. In Chapter 5, a detailed explanation on how to use MultiVeStA with PMAude specifications, will be given.

To illustrate how statistical analysis of probabilistic rewrite theories specified in Pmaude works, the MultiVeStA tool will be used to run simulations over the clock model specified in the previous section and verify properties over it. To do this, the steps to modify and run the clock example are:

1. Define the PMAude model's states as configurations using object-oriented programming in Maude and define the system transitions as rewriting rules between configurations.
2. Implement a scheduler that chooses deterministically the event that is going to be executed.
3. Include the necessary elements of MultiVeStA inside the model's definition.
4. Define an analysis module to define the model observations used by the MultiQuaTEx queries.
5. Define the MultiQuaTEx queries that represent the model's properties that want to be checked.
6. Specify the simulation parameters.
7. Run the simulations using the the probabilistic model, the MultiQuaTEx queries and the simulation parameters.

For the first step, we will create a class named `Clock` defined as:

```
< Oid : Clock | time: Nat, battery: Float, state: State > .
```

where the sort `State` is defined by two constants `working` and `broken`. The initial state of the system is then defined as:

```
< myClock : Clock | time: 0, battery: 1000.0, state: working >
```

And the rewrite rule that simulates the clock's ticks is:

```

rl [clockTick] :
  < cl : Clock | time: T, battery: C, state: working >
=>
  if sampleBernoulli(C / 1000.0) then
    < cl : Clock | time: s(T), battery: (C - (C / 1000.0)),
      state: working >
  else
    < cl : Clock | time: T, battery: C, state: broken >
  fi .

```

In this model, instead of having the exponential function to determine the time increment, to simplify the model it will be fixed to 1. Afterwards, it is necessary to implement the structures required by MultiVeStA to run the simulations. These structures control the simulation's time and schedules the following rules to be applied. Then, the state observations can be defined. These observations correspond to the `rval(i)` predicate defined in [15, 19], and for this example three `rval` predicates are defined as:

- `s.rval("eTime")`: returns the time value of the clock in state `s`, as a float number.
- `s.rval("eBattery")`: returns the battery level of the clock in state `s`.
- `s.rval("isBrk")`: returns 1.0 if the clock is broken in state `s` or 0.0 if the clock is working in state `s`.

Using these predicates, two MultiQuaTEx formulas are defined:

```

PTime() = if ( s.rval("isBrk") == 1.0 )
           then s.rval("eTime") else # PTime() fi ;
eval E[ PTime() ] ;

#-----

PBattery() = if ( s.rval("isBrk") == 1.0 )
              then s.rval("eBattery") else # PBattery() fi ;
eval E[ PBattery() ] ;

```

The first formula states that if the clock is broken (i.e. `s.rval("isBrk") == 1.0`) then the current time of the clock is returned (i.e. `s.rval("eTime")`). If not, the query calls itself in the following system state (i.e. `# PTime()`). The other query has the same behavior as the previous one, but instead of `s.rval("eTime")` is `s.rval("eBattery")`. Therefore, the answer returned by the first query corresponds to the expected value of the clock's time when it breaks, and the answer returned by the second query is the expected value of the clock's battery when it breaks. Once the simulations are executed with the clock probabilistic model, the two MultiQuaTEx formulas, and parameters $\alpha = 0.05$ and $\delta = 1$, the obtained results for both queries were:

Property	ObtainedValue	Variance	CI
PTime()	39.7909482758621	422.729500809641	0.999968586222357

Property	ObtainedValue	Variance	CI
PBattery()	961.13204082891	387.863387550541	0.999651593005253

This means that the expected value of the time when the clock breaks has a probability of $(1 - \alpha) * 100\% = 95\%$ to be inside the interval $[\frac{\delta}{2} - 39.79, \frac{\delta}{2} + 39.79] = [39.29, 40.29]$, and the expected value of the battery level when the clock breaks has a probability of $(1 - \alpha) * 100\% = 95\%$ to be inside the interval $[\frac{\delta}{2} - 961.13, \frac{\delta}{2} + 961.13] = [960.63, 961.63]$.

Chapter 3

A Rewriting Logic Semantics for Probabilistic Event-B

The rewriting logic approach to probabilistic Event-B [17], introduces a method for translating probabilistic Event-B models to PMaude models that are executable in PVeStA. Formally speaking, it is a map $[[\cdot]] : (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M}) \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$ from a probabilistic Event-B model to a rewrite theory. There are two main steps for this transformation:

1. Specify a rewrite theory \mathcal{R} to encode the static parts of the model, i.e. the context and the initialization of the machine.
2. Then, \mathcal{R} is extended with equations and rewrite rules that correspond to the events in the machine \mathcal{M} .

Before explaining how the map $[[\cdot]]$ works, it is necessary to define the elements that the probabilistic Event-B model must have:

- Inside the context, deferred sets and constants can be defined, but properties specified as theorems or axioms using first order logic are not currently supported.
- In the machine, the invariant clause is only used to define the type of the variables. It is not possible to define properties as theorems or invariants using first order logic.
- To define the weight of the events, an expression is used. These expressions can be arithmetic, boolean, and operations over sets or relations.
- The parameter of the event must have a finite domain, which is specified by a set expression or interval of numerical values.
- Event guards must be boolean expressions, that can use other kind of operations (arithmetic, boolean or set operations).
- There are two types of assignments: deterministic assignments that correspond to the usual assignment of an expression to a variable, or probabilistic assignments that

correspond to enumerated probabilistic assignment. Other types of probabilistic assignments are not supported.

For more information, the reader can refer to the [18], to review the accepted grammar for the translation process, in more detail.

The rewrite theory \mathcal{R} works as a framework that allows to represent each one of the Event-B's elements inside Maude. To explore the implementation of it, the reader can refer to [18], where the rewrite theory is specified with multiple Maude system modules in the folder named as `m-theory`. For the sake of simplicity, a general definition of \mathcal{R} will be given.

\mathcal{R} consists of four Maude system modules: `SAMPLER`, `EB-CORE`, `EBCONTEXT`, and `EBMACHINE`. `SAMPLER` contains the definition of functions for probabilistic sampling. `EB-CORE` functions as a prelude, that contains definitions for the representation of basic Event-B constructs such as elements, sets, relations, and operations on them. `EBCONTEXT` defines the structure to encode Event-B's contexts in Maude and `EBMACHINE` does the same for Event-B's machines. The way these modules interact, is represented in Figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1: Interaction between system modules




Figure 3.2: Interaction between \mathcal{R} and the translated model

The figure shows that the `EBMACHINE` module includes the `EBCONTEXT` module, `EBCONTEXT` includes `EB-CORE`, and `EB-CORE` includes `SAMPLER`. When the translation of an Event-B model is done, the resulting specification includes the equations and rewrite rules necessary to extend \mathcal{R} into \mathcal{R}_M . Therefore, the system module that represents the translated Event-B model, must include the `EBMACHINE` module, which also includes all the other mentioned modules. In the end, the interaction between these modules, represent the rewrite theory \mathcal{R}_M , as seen in the Figure 3.2.

Using this framework for representing Event-B models in Maude, it is possible to define the complete encoding $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket$. To guide the reader through the complete encoding, the example of the probabilistic brake system in section 2.3, Figure 2.6, will be used. For the following sections, a *map* will be defined as a set of pairs of the form $(x_1 \mapsto y_1, x_2 \mapsto y_2, \dots, x_n \mapsto y_n)$

3.1 Encoding Contexts

Let \mathcal{C} be a context. The corresponding encoding of \mathcal{C} in \mathcal{R} corresponds to the term:

$$\langle \llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{id} : \text{Context} \mid \text{sets} : \llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{sets}, \text{constants} : \llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{constants} \rangle$$

Where $\llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{id}$ encodes the context's identifier, $\llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{sets}$ encodes the context's deferred sets, and $\llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{constants}$ encodes the context's constants. The resulting term has sort CONFIGURATION, and represents an object of the class Context, with attributes sets and constants. For the probabilistic brake system, the resulting term would be the following:

```
<'ctxBrakeSystem: Context |
    sets: ('SBRAKE |-> (elt("applied"), elt("released")),
          'SPEDAL |-> (elt("down"), elt("up"))),
    constants: ('MAXWEAR |-> val(elt(10))) >
```

- $\llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{id}$ returns the identifier of the context as a *quoted identifier* [21], which is a predefined string in Maude that is used to identify objects. In the brake model, $\llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{id} = \text{'ctxBrakeSystem}$
- $\llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{constants}$ returns a map of quoted identifiers, that represent the constants' names, with a term of the sort EBType, that represents the values of the constants. This sort functions as a wrapper for all the possible types in a Event-B model, i.e. sets, relations and basic data types. These basic data types are defined with the sort EBelt, that also functions as a wrapper for integers, boolean values and identifiers (represented as strings). In the brake model, $\llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{constants} = (\text{'MAXWEAR} \mid\text{->} \text{val(elt(10))})$.
- $\llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{sets}$ returns a map of quoted identifiers, that represent the deferred sets' names, with a set of sort EBSet, that represent the possible values of the deferred set. The sort EBSet is defined as a Maude set, where the elements of the set are of sort EBelt. For example, in the brake model the deferred set that contains the possible states for the *pedal* variable, is represented by the pair $\text{'SPEDAL} \mid\text{->} (\text{elt("down")}, \text{elt("up")})$.

3.2 Machine Initialization in Maude

Let \mathcal{M} be a probabilistic machine. The corresponding encoding of the initialization of \mathcal{M} in \mathcal{R} is the term:

$$\langle \llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{id} : Machine \mid variables : \llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{initVars} \rangle$$

Where $\llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{id}$ encodes the machine's identifier and $\llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{initVars}$ encodes the model's variables to their initial values, defined by the *Init* event. The resulting term has sort CONFIGURATION, and represents an object of the class Machine, with attribute variables. For the probabilistic brake system, the resulting term: would be the following:

```
<'BrakeSystem: Machine | variables: ('brake |-> val(elt("released")),
                                     'pedal |-> val(elt("up")),
                                     'wear |-> val(elt(0))) >
```

- $\llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{id}$ returns the identifier of the machine as a a quoted identifier. In the brake model, $\llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{id} = 'BrakeSystem$.
- $\llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{initVars}$ returns a map of quoted identifiers, that represent the names of the variables, with a term of sort EType, that represent the values of the variables. For example, in the brake model, the variable *pedal* and its value in the initial state are represented by the pair `'pedal |-> val(elt("up"))`.

3.3 Events' States in Maude

In order to simulate the behavior of probabilistic Event-B models in Maude, it is necessary to have a probabilistic method to choose the next event that is going to be executed during simulation. To do this, it is necessary to define a structure that contains the states of the events in each system configuration. These possible event's states are:

- **unknown:** the event's guards have not been evaluated.
- **enabled(*n*):** the event's guard is true with weight *n*.
- **blocked:** the event's guard is false.
- **execute:** the event has been chosen for execution in the next system transition.

This structure maps each one of the events of the model to their corresponding event state in a given system configuration. Therefore, it allows to check after each system transition the states of the events. In the meantime, this section focuses on how this structure is initialized, but the use for this structure will be detailed in the following sections.

Let \mathcal{M} be a probabilistic machine. The corresponding encoding of the initialization of the events' states in \mathcal{R} is the term:

$$\langle events : Events \mid state : \llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{initEvtSt} \rangle$$

Where $\llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{initEvtSt}$ encodes the initialization of the event's states. The resulting term has sort CONFIGURATION, and represents an object of the class Events, with attribute state. $\llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{initEvtSt}$ returns a set $ev(evt_1, st_1), \dots, ev(evt_n, st_n)$ where each evt_i is a quoted identifier that represents the name of the event, and st_i is a term of sort EvState, that represents the state of the event. In this case, all of the terms st_i is equal to *unknown* ($st_i = unknown$), since in the initialization of the model none of the guards of the events have been evaluated. For the brake system, the resulting term after the encoding would be:

```
< events : Events | state: (ev('PushPedal, unknown)
                           ev('ReleasePedal, unknown)
                           ev('ApplyBrake, unknown)
                           ev('ApplyBrakeFailure, unknown)
                           ev('ReleaseBrake, unknown)) >
```

3.4 Initial State and System States in Maude

As seen in chapter 2, the states of the specification of a system in Maude, are represented using terms. For the translated models from probabilistic Event-B models, the initial system state of the system is:

$$\begin{aligned} & \langle \llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{id} : Context \mid sets : \llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{sets}, constants : \llbracket \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{constants} \rangle \\ & \langle \llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{id} : Machine \mid variables : \llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{initVars} \rangle \\ & \langle events : Events \mid state : \llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{initEvtSt} \rangle \end{aligned}$$

This term has sort CONFIGURATION, and combines the previously explained objects. To refer to this term, the following notation will be used:

$$\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathfrak{E}$$

Where \mathfrak{C} is the term that represents the context, \mathfrak{M}_0 is the term that represents the machine in the initial state, and \mathfrak{E} is the term that represents the events' states in the current system configuration. The rest of the system states, are symbolized with $\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i \mathfrak{E}$, and are obtained with the application of equations and rewrite rules, defined in $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$, over the initial state $\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathfrak{E}$. With these elements, the definition of the rewrite theory \mathcal{R} is concluded. The following sections provide the definition of the equations and rewrite rules that define $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$.

3.5 evalSt Equation

The *evalSt* equation, determines if an event is enabled or blocked, given the current state of the machine \mathfrak{M}_i , and the encoding of the guards of the event e_i , represented

as $\llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{guards}^{e_i}$:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i \langle events : Events \mid state : ev(e_1, unknown) \dots ev(e_n, unknown) \rangle = \\ \mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i \langle events : Events \mid state : ev(e_1, eval(\mathfrak{M}_i, \llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{guards}^{e_1})) \dots ev(e_n, eval(\mathfrak{M}, \llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{guards}^{e_n})) \rangle \end{aligned}$$

To do this, for each one of the event states $ev(evt_1, st_1), \dots, ev(evt_n, st_n)$, the equation evaluates the new state of the event e_i with the equation $eval$. The equation takes as input the current state of the machine \mathfrak{M}_i , i.e. the value of each one of the variables, and then determines if the guards of event e_i are satisfied, using the encoded version of the guards $\llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{guards}^{e_n}$. The returned value by $eval$ can only be `enabled(n)`, where n corresponds to the weight of the event, if the guards of the event are satisfied in \mathfrak{M}_i , or `blocked` otherwise. For example, if $evalSt$ is applied to the first state $\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathfrak{E}$, the obtained term is:

```
 $\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_0 < events : Events \mid state: (ev('PushPedal, enabled(10))$ 
       $ev('ReleasePedal, blocked)$ 
       $ev('ApplyBrake, blocked)$ 
       $ev('ApplyBrakeFailure, blocked)$ 
       $ev('ReleaseBrake, blocked)) >$ 
```

3.6 *chooseEvt* Rule

The *chooseEvt* rule chooses probabilistically, the next event to be executed according to the weights of the enabled events:

$$\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i \langle state : ev(e_1, st_1) \dots ev(e_n, st_n) \rangle \rightarrow \mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i \langle state : ev(e_i, execute) \rangle$$

To do this, the following steps must be applied:

1. Filter out the events $ev(e_i, st_i)$ where $st_i = \text{blocked}$. Thus, the remaining set of event states will have the form $ev(e_j, \text{enabled}(n_j)), \dots, ev(e_k, \text{enabled}(n_k))$.
2. From the enabled events, choose probabilistically one of the events e_i , according to their weights $n_j \dots n_k$, as done in probabilistic Event-B.
3. The chosen event e_i is paired with the state `execute`, and the resulting set of event states is $ev(e_i, \text{execute})$.

For example, if the rule is applied to the following state from the brake example:

```
 $\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i < events : Events \mid state: ev('PushPedal, blocked)$ 
       $ev('ReleasePedal, enabled(10))$ 
       $ev('ApplyBrake, enabled(7))$ 
       $ev('ApplyBrakeFailure, enabled(3))$ 
       $ev('ReleaseBrake, blocked) >$ 
```

The resulting term with the highest probability is:

```
ℳ ℳi <events : Events | state : ev('ReleasePedal, execute)>
```

Since in this specific state, the *ReleasePedal* event has the biggest weight. In other system states, the weights of the enabled events are not going to be the same, thus the behavior of the rule will be different.

3.7 *execEvt_{e_i}* Rule

For each one of the events e_i in the original probabilistic Event-B model, a rule $execEvt_{e_i}$ is encoded. It is defined as:

$$\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i \langle state : ev(e_i, execute) \rangle \rightarrow \mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_j \langle state : \llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{initEvtSt} \rangle$$

where \mathfrak{M}_j is obtained by changing the variable values according to the encoded probabilistic assignments of the specific event e_i . Furthermore, after making the system transition from $\mathfrak{M}_i \rightarrow \mathfrak{M}_j$, the states of the events are reseted to unknown, as done in the initialization of the model. For example, if the current state is:

```
ℳ <'BrakeSystem: Machine | variables: ('brake |-> val(elt("released")),
                                       'pedal |-> val(elt("up")),
                                       'wear |-> val(elt(0))) >
  <events : Events | state: ev('PushPedal, execute) >
```

After executing rule $execEvt_{PushPedal}$ the resulting state with highest probability is:

```
ℳ <'BrakeSystem: Machine | variables: ('brake |-> val(elt("released")),
                                       'pedal |-> val(elt("down")),
                                       'wear |-> val(elt(0))) >
  < events : Events | state: (ev('PushPedal, unknown)
                             ev('ReleasePedal, unknown)
                             ev('ApplyBrake, unknown)
                             ev('ApplyBrakeFailure, unknown)
                             ev('ReleaseBrake, unknown)) >
```

Since the *down* value for the *pedal* variable, has a 90% chance of being selected, in the probabilistic assignment from the original model.

3.8 $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$ in a Nutshell

Using all the previously explained elements of the rewrite theory $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$, it is possible to summarize how the encoding produces a rewrite theory, that has the same behavior of a probabilistic Event-B model:

1. The probabilistic Event-B model is encoded to the rewrite theory $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$, using $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket$:

$$\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket : (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M}) \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$$

2. The system is initialized with term $\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathfrak{E}$ in $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$:

$$\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathfrak{E}$$

3. For any state of the model, symbolized by \mathfrak{M}_i , the event guards are evaluated using the equation *evalSt*.

$$\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i \langle state : ev(e_1, unknown) \dots ev(e_n, unknown) \rangle \xrightarrow{evalSt} \mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i \langle state : ev(e_1, st_1) \dots ev(e_n, st_n) \rangle$$

4. The blocked events are filtered out and the next event is chosen probabilistically from all the enabled events, based on the event's weights:

$$\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i \langle state : ev(e_1, st_1) \dots ev(e_n, st_n) \rangle \xrightarrow{chooseEvt} \mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i \langle state : ev(e_i, execute) \rangle$$

5. The rule associated to the encoded version of the chosen event e_i in the previous step is executed. The resulting change of the variable values, is captured in the rewrite $\mathfrak{M}_i \xrightarrow{execEvt_{e_i}} \mathfrak{M}_j$. Moreover, the states of the events are initialized again.

$$\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i \langle state : ev(e_i, execute) \rangle \xrightarrow{execEvt_{e_i}} \mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_j \langle state : ev(e_1, unknown) \dots ev(e_n, unknown) \rangle$$

6. Repeat steps 3, 4 and 5 until deadlock (i.e. none of the events can be executed since the guards of the events are unsatisfiable), or until the rule *execEvt_{e_i}* has been executed a fixed number of times (this value is represented as a constant named MAX-STEPS in $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$).

Based on the presented encoding, it is possible to prove that the resulting rewrite theory $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$ is semantically correct, based on the probabilistic Event-B model $(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M})$:

Theorem 3.8.1 (adequacy) *Let $(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M})$ be an Event-B model and $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$ be a rewrite theory obtained by the encoding $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket : (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M}) \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$. Furthermore, let s and s' be states or configurations of \mathcal{M} (i.e. valuations of the variables in \mathcal{M}), and $s \xrightarrow{e_i, p} s'$ be a system transition from state s to s' , using the event e_i with probability p . Then $s \xrightarrow{e_i, p} s'$ iff $\llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_s \rightarrow_p \llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{s'}$, where $\llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_s$ and $\llbracket \mathcal{M} \rrbracket_{s'}$ correspond to the encoded version of states s and s' respectively, and \rightarrow_p denotes one-step rewriting in $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$ with probability p .*

Proof. The reader can refer to [17] for the proof sketch of this theorem \square .

Chapter 4

MultiVeStA: Statistical Model Checking of PMaude Specifications

As mentioned before, MultiVeStA is an extension of both VeStA and PVeStA that can be used to perform statistical model checking of PMaude specifications. Hence, the main purpose of this chapter is to present a general introduction to understand how MultiVeStA works, and how it can be used to verify PMaude specifications, obtained with the encoding from the previous chapter.

4.1 MultiVeStA's components and processes

First and foremost, the MultiVeStA tool was developed by Andrea Vandin, and it is available to download in a public repository in GitHub [26]. The main components of the tool are:

- **Maude-3.0+yices2:** A folder that contains the Maude distribution used by the tool. It is important to note, that MultiVeStA is not integrated with Maude. It only uses this folder to run the simulations.
- **apmaude.maude:** A Maude file that contains the necessary sorts, equations and rules to extend any PMaude specification, so it can be checked using the tool.
- **multivesta.jar:** A java executable that runs the simulations using the specified PMaude model, the MultiQuaTeX query, and the simulation parameters.

To run simulations of a specific PMaude specification, it is necessary to define:

- **model.maude:** A Maude file that contains the specification of the PMaude model to be verified.
- **query.multiquatex:** A MultiQuaTeX file, with the quantitative temporal logic formula written in the MultiQuaTeX language, that will be used to verify the model.

- **Simulations Parameters:** There are multiple parameters to take into account when performing simulations with the tool:
 - α and δ , already explained in Section 2.7.
 - bs , which defines the number of simulations that each batch will contain (this parameter will be further detailed in the current section).




Figure 4.1: MultiVeStA’s components

With these components, it is then possible to run the simulations and obtain the results of the query, as seen in Figure 4.1. The way MultiVeStA obtains these simulation results can be defined in the following steps:

1. MultiVeStA performs bs number of simulations and calculates the confidence interval based on the results obtained in each one of the simulations. Each simulation consists of:
 - (a) Get the initial state of the system s_0 by running *model.maude*, which includes the theory specified in *apmaude.maude*, using the *Maude-3.0+yices2* distribution.
 - (b) Evaluate the MultiQuaTEx formula in *query.multiquatex* over s_0 . If the formula evaluates to true, then the simulation ends and the result of the query is returned. Otherwise, MultiVeStA performs one step in the simulation, to get the next state s_i .
 - (c) Repeat step b with the new state s_i , until reaching a state where the formula is true and the results are returned.

As shown in Section 2.7, the result of a MultiQuaTEx formula is a floating point value. Therefore, with each one of the values returned by the query in each simulation, the confidence interval of the batch is calculated.

2. If the confidence interval satisfies the parameter α and δ i.e. the real value of the query x has a probability $(1 - \alpha) * 100\%$ of being in the interval $[\bar{x} - \frac{\delta}{2}, \bar{x} + \frac{\delta}{2}]$, where \bar{x} is the current value calculated for the query using the simulations, then MultiVeStA

returns the results and ends its execution. If not, then MultiVeStA will send another batch of simulations until the confidence interval is finally reached.

In general, the complete process can be viewed in the following flowchart:




Figure 4.2: Flowchart of MultiVeStA's process

Having understood how the general process to perform simulations in MultiVeStA is done, it is necessary to define how to modify a PMAude specification to be able to run it with the tool. To do this, in the next section, a general explanation will be given that illustrates how individual simulations work (sub-steps a, b and c from the step 1), and how this can be achieved by including new elements into the PMAude models that are going to be verified.

4.2 MultiVeStA and Maude interaction

The way MultiVeStA sends and retrieves information from Maude, is through the Maude console. Initially, MultiVeStA loads the `apmaude.maude` and `model.maude` file through the Maude console. Then, MultiVeStA sends commands to the Maude console and Maude executes these commands. Finally, MultiVeStA reads these results from the Maude's console and use them to calculate the results of the simulations. This process is captured in the following sequence diagram:




Figure 4.3: Sequence diagram of MultiVeStA and Maude interaction

In order to fully detail the process specified in Figure 4.3, it is necessary to define some preliminary operators and equations contained in `apmaude.maude` and `model.maude`. Hence, the following list contains the description of these structures and their respective definitions:

- **Scheduler:** the scheduler is a structure that contains the current number of steps or transitions in the simulation, represented as a float number, and a list of scheduler elements. In Maude this is specified as:

```
op {_|_} : Float ScheduleList -> Scheduler .
```

Each one of the scheduler elements corresponds to a pair that contains a message that identifies the next rewriting rule to be applied, and a float number that specifies in which step of the simulation the rule is going to be applied. They also contain a third value, which is a natural number that is used as a flag to drop or keep scheduler elements when inserted (this will be explained in more detail in the `insert` equation). In Maude this is defined as:

```
op [_,_,_] : Float Msg Nat -> ScheduleElem [ ctor ] .
op [_,_] : Float Msg -> ScheduleElem .
```

```
var t1 : Float .
var M1 : Msg .
```

```
eq [ t1 , M1 ] = [ t1 , M1 , 0 ] .
```

The scheduler forms part of the system states. Thus, to be able to include it in the configuration, the sort `Scheduler` is a subsort of the sort `Configuration`.

```
subsort Scheduler < Configuration .
```

The scheduler is a very important part of the simulation process, since it will be in charge of determining the next transition or rewriting rule to be applied to the model's current configuration during a simulation. Associated to the scheduler, there is an operator named `insert`, that allows to insert new elements in the scheduler list. This is defined as:

```
op insert : Scheduler ScheduleElem -> Scheduler .
op insert : ScheduleList ScheduleElem -> ScheduleList .

vars t1 t2 gt : Float .
var SL : ScheduleList .
var e : ScheduleElem .
vars M1 M2 : Msg .
var p : Nat .

eq insert({ gt | SL },e) = { gt | insert(SL,e) } .
eq insert(SL , [ t2 , M2 , 1]) = SL .
eq insert( nilSL , [ t2 , M2 , 0]) = [ t2 , M2 , 0] .
eq insert([ t1 , M1 , p] ; SL , [ t2 , M2 , 0]) =
  if t1 < t2
    then [ t1 , M1 , p] ; insert(SL, [ t2 , M2 , 0])
    else ([ t2 , M2 , 0] ; [ t1 , M1 , p] ; SL)
  fi .
```

What this equation does is to take a scheduler, a scheduler element, and insert the element inside the list of the scheduler according to the float number in the scheduler elements, like a priority queue. In the end, the first element in the list is going to contain the message that specifies the next rule to be executed, since it has the smallest step. If the value of the flag is 1, then the element is not inserted, but if it is 0, then the element is inserted.

Moreover, the scheduler induces an implicit constraint over the model specified in `model.maude`: the selection of the next rule to be applied must be deterministic, in the sense that in every state of the simulation, the next rule must be pre-selected, instead of the non-deterministic mechanism for choosing rules in Maude. For this reason, `model.maude` must have a rule or equation that chooses the next rule during the simulations.

- **Random Counter:** the random counter is a structure that contains a natural number, that will be used to select random numbers, similar to the `COUNTER` module explained in Section 2.6. The reason for not using the `COUNTER` module in `Multi-VeStA` and using a structure that saves the value of the counter, is because during

simulation MultiVeStA resets the Maude console. Therefore, if the COUNTER module is used, the value of the counter to select random numbers will always be 0. With every application of a rule, the idea is to change the number of the random counter, so the generated random numbers are different in every simulation step. In Maude, the random counter is defined as:

```
op randomCounter : Nat -> Object [ ctor ] .
```

The random counter has sort `Object` since it is also part of the system state.

- **States of the Simulation:** as defined in Section 2.4, states of a Maude specification are represented with a term. In this case, the states in the simulations have sort `Configuration` and are defined as:

```
var gt : Float .
var SL : ScheduleList .
var C : Configuration .
var n : Nat .

{gt | SL} {C randomCounter(n)}
```

where $\{gt \mid SL\}$ is a term of sort `Scheduler` and `C` is a term of sort `Configuration`. The curly brackets $\{-\}$ are an operator defined as:

```
op { _ } : Configuration -> Configuration [ ctor ] .
```

`C` represents the original states of the model without the required elements to run it with MultiVeStA, i.e. the scheduler and the random counter. For instance, in the clock example from section 2.7, the term:

```
< myClock : Clock | time: Nat, battery: Float, state: State >
```

represents the configuration `C`. Finally, `randomCounter(n)`, as explained before, is an object that contains a natural number that will be used to generate random numbers. Additionally, there is an operator named `tick`, defined as:

```
op tick : Configuration -> Configuration .
op mytick : Scheduler -> Configuration .
```

```
vars t1 gt : Float .
var C : Configuration .
var sc : Scheduler .
var p : Nat .
var SL : ScheduleList .
var M1 : Msg .
```

```

eq tick( sc C ) = mytick(sc) C .
eq mytick({ gt | [ t1 , M1 , p] ; SL }) = M1 { t1 | SL } .
eq mytick({ gt | nilSL }) = { gt | nilSL } .

```

The purpose of this operator is to take out the first element from the scheduler list, add the message inside the scheduler element (i.e. $M1$) to the current state of the simulation, and replace gt with the step inside the scheduler element (i.e. $t1$).

- **Initial State:** as the name suggests it, this term corresponds to the initial state of the system. It is defined as:

```

op init : -> Configuration .
op initState : -> Configuration .
eq initState = closeWorldExceptScheduler(init)

```

For the initial state there are two operators involved: `init` and `initState`. `init` is a constant of sort `Configuration`, that must be defined by the user in the `model.maude` file with the equation:

```

eq init = {0.0 | nilSL} C0 randomCounter(0) .

```

It initializes the scheduler with steps equal to 0.0 and an empty list of scheduler elements written as `nilSL`. The term `C0` is the configuration that represents the initial state of the model, and `randomCounter` starts with the value 0. `initState` corresponds to the application of the equation `closeWorldExceptScheduler` over the constant `init`. This equation is defined as:

```

op closeWorldExceptScheduler : Configuration -> Configuration .
eq closeWorldExceptScheduler(sc C) = sc { C } .

```

The equation is used to group all the objects from the configuration and isolate the scheduler. Thus, inside the curly brackets the objects will be the system state and the random counter: $\{C \text{ randomCounter}(n)\}$.

- **Scheduler Rule:** Continuing with the observation made about the scheduler, a rule SR will be defined inside `model.maude`, that is in charge of selecting the next rule that is going to be applied to the current system state. For that reason, the SR rule must insert in the scheduler list the scheduler element that has the message that represents the rule chosen by the SR rule.
- **Rule Associated to a Message:** Each one of the scheduler elements contains a message M_i that will be used to identify the next rule that is going to be executed. Therefore, the associated rule must consider in its definition the presence of the message M_i . Based on this, the rule R_{M_i} can be defined as the rule associated with the message M_i , and specified as:

```

rl : Mi {gt | SL} {C randomCounter(n)} =>
      {gt | SL} {C' randomCounter(n)} .

```

The rule eliminates the message from the configuration and changes the term `C` to `C'`, indicating that the rule has been applied, and the state of the system has been changed.

- **Val operator:** This operator is used to define observations over the states of the system, allowing to extract valuable information that can be then evaluated in the MultiQuaTEx query using the `s.rval()` function, explained in Section 2.7. It is defined as:

```

op val : Nat Configuration -> Float .
op val : String Configuration -> Float .

```

Where the natural number and the string serve as identifiers, and the configuration represents the state where the observation is going to be made. For example, recall the state observation `s.rval("isBrk")` in the clock example from Section 2.7. For MultiVeStA to be able to get the value for `s.rval("isBrk")` when evaluating the MultiQuaTEx query, the user must define in `model.maude` the corresponding equation with the `val` operator and the same identifier, in this case `"isBrk"`. The resulting equation in the `model.maude` files is:

```

var C : Configuration .
var gt : Float .
var SL : ScheduleList .
var cl : Oid .
var n : Nat .

--- returns 1.0 if the clock is broken, 0.0 if not
op isBroken : Configuration -> Float .
eq isBroken(< cl : Clock | state: broken, attrSet > C) = 1.0 .
eq isBroken(< cl : Clock | state: working, attrSet > C) = 0.0 .

--- Eval if the clock is broken
op val("isBrk", {gt | SL} {C randomCounter(n)}) = isBroken(C) .

```

It is also important to mention, that there are two predefined state observations in MultiVeStA, which are `s.rval("steps")` and `s.rval("time")`. The former returns the number of ticks done in the simulation, and the latter returns the value `gt` of the scheduler `{gt | SL}`.

Having defined the preliminary structures used in the simulations, the complete process of a single simulation will be described in detail as a series of steps:

0. The user defines the initial state as:

```
eq init = {0.0 | nilSL} C0 randomCounter(0) .
```

and the state observations:

```
eq val("obs1", {gt | SL} {C randomCounter(n)}) = ...
eq val("obs2", {gt | SL} {C randomCounter(n)}) = ...
...
eq val("obsn", {gt | SL} {C randomCounter(n)}) = ...
```

in model.maude.

1. MultiVeStA loads the apmaude.maude and the model.maude files to Maude, using the Maude console.
2. MultiVeStA sends the command `rew initState`.

(a) Maude reduces the `initState` term:

$$\text{initState} \rightarrow \{0.0 \mid \text{nilSL}\} \{C0 \text{ randomCounter}(0)\} .$$

(b) The rule SR chooses the next rule to be executed, represented with the message Mi , by inserting an element in the scheduler list. The random counter is also incremented:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \{0.0 \mid \text{nilSL}\} & \xrightarrow{SR} & \text{insert}(\{0.0 \mid \text{nilSL}\}, [gt + 1.0, Mi]) \\ \{C0 \text{ randomCounter}(0)\} & & \{C0 \text{ randomCounter}(0+1)\} \end{array}$$

(c) Maude reduces the terms:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{insert}(\{0.0 \mid \text{nilSL}\}, [0.0 + 1.0, Mi]) & \rightarrow & \{0.0 \mid [1.0, Mi]\} \\ \{C0 \text{ randomCounter}(0+1)\} & & \{C0 \text{ randomCounter}(1)\} \end{array}$$

3. MultiVeStA reads the Maude console and saves the current configuration. The saved configuration will be named as `Conf`.
4. MultiVeStA evaluates the query in `query.multiquatex`, using the user defined equations for the `val` operators, to calculate the `s.rval()` state observations. To do this, for every `s.rval("obs")` in the query, MultiVeStA sends to Maude the command `red val("obs", Conf)`, and obtains the float number returned by the equation. Using these results of the `val` equations, then MultiVeStA is able to evaluate the query.
5. If the query is satisfied, then MultiVeStA gets the float number returned by the query. If not, then continue with step 6.
6. MultiVeStA sends the command `rew tick(Conf)`.

(a) Maude reduces the term `rew tick (Conf)`:

$$\text{tick}(\{\text{gt} \mid [\text{gt}' , \text{Mi}]\} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{Mi} \{\text{gt}' \mid \text{nilSL} \} \\ \{\text{C} \text{ randomCounter}(n)\}) \quad \{\text{C} \text{ randomCounter}(n)\}$$

(b) Maude rewrites the term with the rule associated with the message `Mi`:

$$\text{Mi} \{\text{gt}' \mid \text{nilSL}\} \quad \xrightarrow{R_{M_i}} \quad \{\text{gt}' \mid \text{nilSL} \} \\ \{\text{C} \text{ randomCounter}(n)\} \quad \{\text{C}' \text{ randomCounter}(n)\}$$

In this case, the term `C'` represents the next state of the model after applying R_{M_i} over `C`.

(c) The rule `SR` chooses the next rule to be executed, represented with the message `Mj`:

$$\{\text{gt}' \mid \text{nilSL} \} \quad \xrightarrow{SR} \quad \text{insert}(\{\text{gt}' \mid \text{nilSL}\}, [\text{gt}' + 1.0 , \text{Mj}]) \\ \{\text{C}' \text{ randomCounter}(n)\} \quad \{\text{C}' \text{ randomCounter}(n+1)\}$$

(d) Maude reduces the terms:

$$\text{insert}(\{\text{gt}' \mid \text{nilSL}\}, [\text{gt}' + 1.0 , \text{Mj}]) \rightarrow \{\text{gt}' \mid [\text{gt}' + 1.0 , \text{Mj}]\} \\ \{\text{C}' \text{ randomCounter}(n+1)\} \quad \{\text{C}' \text{ randomCounter}(n+1)\}$$

7. Repeat step 3 and 4.

8. If the query is satisfied, then get the float number returned by the query. If not, then repeat steps 6 through 8 over the previous configuration `Conf`, until the formula is satisfied.

The complete process can be visualized in a sequence diagram in Figure 4.4, that extends the previous one presented in Figure 4.3:




Figure 4.4: Extension of sequence diagram in Figure 4.3

Based on this introduction to MultiVeStA and Chapter 3, the next section will present the integration between the rewriting logic approach to probabilistic Event-B and MultiVeStA.

4.3 Using MultiVeStA to verify \mathcal{R}_M

To verify properties of probabilistic Event-B models encoded as probabilistic rewrite theories \mathcal{R}_M , it is necessary to list the required components to complete this process. First,

the mandatory theory to specify the encoded model that wants to be checked, should be included, i.e. the rewrite theory \mathcal{R} with the modules SAMPLER, EB-CORE, EBCONTEXT and EBMACHINE. Then, the model.maude file should specify the system module MODEL, which includes \mathcal{R} . The interaction between the model and MultiVeStA is specified in Figure 4.5.




Figure 4.5: Interaction between the encoded model and MultiVeStA

Even though the simulation process is the same, as described in Figures 4.2 and 4.4, it is important to consider and identify the differences that arise when the simulation of the encoded models is done. Hence, the rest of this section will specify and describe how the same series of steps explained in Section 4.2, also works with the specific case of probabilistic rewrite theories $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$. Initially, the following list contains the required definitions to understand the simulation process:

- **States of the Simulation in $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$:** Given that the general definition for a state of a model, that can be verified with MultiVeStA is:

```
{gt | SL} {C randomCounter(n)}
```

Then, replacing the term C with the term that represents states in $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$, the resulting configuration is:

```
{gt | SL} {C Mi E randomCounter(n)}
```

- **Initial State in $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$:** the initial state of the simulation is specified with the operator `init` and it is defined as:

```
eq init = {0.0 | nilSL} C M0 E randomCounter(0) .
```

- **Messages in $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$:** The messages that identify the next rule to be applied are defined for the translated models $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$ with the operator:

```
op _<-_ : Oid Content -> Msg .
```

where the Oid is the object identifier of the machine \mathcal{M} , and the second parameter of sort Content is used to identify the rule to be applied. For example for the brake system example explained in Section 2.3 and Chapter 3, the message that identifies the push pedal rule in the model would be:

```
op RulePushPedal : -> Content [ ctor ] .
'BrakeSystem <- RulePushPedal
```

- **Scheduler Rule in $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$:** In the case of translated models $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$ by the encoding, the *SR* rule explained in the previous section corresponds to the *chooseEvt* rule. To integrate the *chooseEvt* rule with the scheduler, an auxiliary equation is used to identify the selected rule and insert it to the scheduler. The definition of this rule is:

```
var gt : Float .
var n : Nat .
var SL : ScheduleList .
var MNAME : Oid .
var ruleQid : Qid .

op scheduleEvent : Configuration -> Configuration .
eq scheduleEvent( { gt | SL }
  {  $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{M}_i$ 
    < events : Events | state: ( ev(ruleQid, execute) ) >
    randomCounter(n) } )
=
  insert({ gt | SL },
    [ gt + 1.0 , (MNAME <- qidToContent(ruleQid)),0])
  {  $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{M}_i$ 
    < events : Events | state: ( ev(ruleQid, execute) ) >
    randomCounter(n) } .
```

where MNAME is the object identifier of the machine \mathcal{M}_i , ruleQid is the quoted identifier of the selected rule, and qidToContent is an equation that maps the Qid of every rule, to a term of sort Content.

- **Rule R_{M_i} in $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$:** the *execEvt_{e_i}* rule in $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$, corresponds to the R_{M_i} rule. To adapt each one of the rules *execEvt_{e_i}* to emulate the behavior of R_{M_i} , it is necessary to include in the definition of *execEvt_{e_i}*, the message that represents the event. For example, if the rule *execEvt_{e_i}* is defined as:

```
rl [eventEi]: { gt | SL }  $\mathcal{C} \mathcal{M}_i$   $\mathcal{E}$  randomCounter(n)
```

$$\Rightarrow$$

$$\{ \text{gt} \mid \text{SL} \} \mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_j \mathfrak{E} \text{ randomCounter}(n)$$

then, the adapted rule is:

```
r1 [eventEi]: (MNAME <- eventEi) { gt | SL }  $\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_i \mathfrak{E}$  randomCounter(n)
 $\Rightarrow$ 
{ gt | SL }  $\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_j \mathfrak{E}$  randomCounter(n)
```

where MNAME is the Oid of the machine, and eventEi is a term of sort content that identifies the rule.

With these definitions, it is now possible to redefine the simulation steps explained in the previous section:

0. The user defines the initial state as:

```
eq init = {0.0 | nilSL}  $\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathfrak{E}$  randomCounter(0) .
```

and the state observations:

```
eq val("obs1", {gt | SL} { $\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M} \mathfrak{E}$  randomCounter(n)}) = ...
eq val("obs2", {gt | SL} { $\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M} \mathfrak{E}$  randomCounter(n)}) = ...
...
eq val("obsn", {gt | SL} { $\mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M} \mathfrak{E}$  randomCounter(n)}) = ...
```

inside model.maude.

1. MultiVeStA loads the apmaude.maude, the files that contain the modules SAMPLER, EB-CORE, EBCONTEXT and EBMACHINE, and the model.maude file which includes the previous modules.
2. MultiVeStA sends the command `rew initState`.

- (a) Maude reduces the `initState` term:

$$\text{initState} \rightarrow \{0.0 \mid \text{nilSL}\} \{ \mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathfrak{E} \text{ randomCounter}(0) \} .$$

- (b) The rule *chooseEvt* chooses the next rule to be executed. The random counter is also incremented:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \{0.0 \mid \text{nilSL}\} & \xrightarrow{\text{chooseEvt}} & \text{scheduleEvent}(\{0.0 \mid \text{nilSL}\} \\ \{ \mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathfrak{E} \text{ randomCounter}(0) \} & & \{ \mathfrak{C} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathfrak{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(0+1) \}) \end{array}$$

where $\mathfrak{E}' = \langle \text{events:Events} \mid \text{state:}(\text{ev}(\text{ruleQid}, \text{execute})) \rangle$

- (c) Maude reduces the terms:

$$\text{scheduleEvent}(\{0.0 \mid \text{nilSL}\} \rightarrow \text{insert}(\{0.0 \mid \text{nilSL}\}, [0.0+1.0, MG, 0])) \\ \{\mathcal{E} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathcal{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(0+1)\} \quad \{\mathcal{E} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathcal{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(1)\}$$

$$\text{insert}(\{0.0 \mid \text{nilSL}\}, [0.0+1.0, MG, 0]) \rightarrow \{0.0 \mid [1.0, MG]\} \\ \{\mathcal{E} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathcal{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(1)\} \quad \{\mathcal{E} \mathfrak{M}_0 \mathcal{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(1)\}$$

Where $MG = (\text{MNAME} \leftarrow \text{qidToContent}(\text{ruleQid}))$

3. Do steps 3, 4 and 5 from the previous section.
4. MultiVeStA sends the command `rew tick(Conf)`.

(a) Maude reduces the term `rew tick(Conf)`:

$$\text{tick}(\{\text{gt} \mid [\text{gt}' , MG]\} \rightarrow MG \{\text{gt}' \mid \text{nilSL}\} \\ \{\mathcal{E} \mathfrak{M}_i \mathcal{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(n)\} \quad \{\mathcal{E} \mathfrak{M}_i \mathcal{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(n)\}$$

(b) Maude rewrites the term with the rule associated with the message M_i :

$$MG \{\text{gt}' \mid \text{nilSL}\} \xrightarrow{\text{execEvt}_{e_i}} \{\text{gt}' \mid \text{nilSL}\} \\ \{\mathcal{E} \mathfrak{M}_i \mathcal{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(n)\} \quad \{\mathcal{E} \mathfrak{M}_j \mathcal{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(n)\}$$

Where \mathfrak{M}_j is the next system state after applying the rule execEvt_{e_i} . Note that $\mathcal{E} = \langle \text{events} : \text{Events} \mid \text{state} : \text{ev}(e_1, \text{unknown}) \dots \text{ev}(e_n, \text{unknown}) \rangle$

(c) The rule chooseEvt chooses the next rule to be executed:

$$\{\text{gt}' \mid \text{nilSL}\} \xrightarrow{\text{chooseEvt}} \text{scheduleEvent}(\{\text{gt}' \mid \text{nilSL}\} \\ \{\mathcal{E} \mathfrak{M}_j \mathcal{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(n)\} \quad \{\mathcal{E} \mathfrak{M}_j \mathcal{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(n+1)\})$$

where $\mathcal{E}' = \langle \text{events} : \text{Events} \mid \text{state} : (\text{ev}(\text{ruleQid}, \text{execute})) \rangle$.

(d) Maude reduces the terms:

$$\text{scheduleEvent}(\{\text{gt}' \mid \text{nilSL}\} \rightarrow \{\text{gt}' \mid [\text{gt}' + 1.0, MG]\} \\ \{\mathcal{E} \mathfrak{M}_j \mathcal{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(n+1)\} \quad \{\mathcal{E} \mathfrak{M}_j \mathcal{E}' \text{ randomCounter}(n+1)\})$$

5. Repeat step 3.
6. If the query is satisfied, then get the float number returned by the query. If not, then repeat steps 4 through 6 over the previous configuration `Conf`, until the formula is satisfied.

Following this process, it is then possible to do statistical model checking over $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{M}}$ rewrite theories, and evaluate MultiQuaTEx queries. In the next section, some case studies will be presented to illustrate the interplay between the translation process from probabilistic Event-B to PMaude, and MultiVeStA.

Chapter 5

Case Studies

The purpose of these case studies is to test the correct integration of the translation process from probabilistic Event-B to PMaude, with the MultiVeStA tool. In total there are 3 case studies: two probabilistic programs using dices and coins, a bounded retransmission protocol, and a program that simulates a modal operator in positive negative logic. The repository that contains the code of this integration can be found in reference: <https://github.com/dfosorio/EventB2Maude-MultiVeStA>. Furthermore, this repository contains the code of the probabilistic Event-B models, their translated versions in PMaude, and the results of the simulations of the case studies. A short guide on how to use the software can also be found in the repository.

5.1 Dice Programs

The dice programs, based on the Knuth & Yao paper [27], were found in the PRISM model checker web page [28]. The idea is to translate the model from the PRISM language to probabilistic Event-B, and afterwards translate the probabilistic Event-B model into PMaude using the translation process. The resulting PMaude specification will then be verified using MultiVeStA. In the end, we expect that the results from the MultiVeStA simulations are equal to the PRISM model checker results. The probabilistic model for the first dice program is the following:




Figure 5.1: States and transitions of the dice model, taken from [28]

Having as a reference the Figure 5.1, the starting state of the model is the state 0. A fair coin is tossed to decide the next transition to execute. If the coin lands on heads, then the upper branch is taken. Conversely, when the coin lands on tails, the lower branch is taken. This process is repeated in each one of the states 1 to 6, until reaching a terminating state, i.e. reaching a state where one of the dice faces is chosen. To represent this model in probabilistic Event-B, a deferred set with all the states of the model is created in the context.

```
CONTEXT ctxDiceProgram1
SETS
  STATES : { s0, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7 }
CONSTANTS
END
```

where the state s_7 , in conjunction with the dice variable, represent all the possible terminating states. In the machine of the model, two variables will be considered: one that stores the current state of the system and other that contains the current value of the dice.

```
MACHINE DiceProgram1
  SEES ctxDiceProgram1

  VARIABLES
    st
    dice
  INVARIANTS
    st : STATES
    dice : Nat
```

Each one of the transitions or coin tosses is represented with an event. For example, the first two transitions that start in state 0 can be represented with the event:

```

EVENT State0Trans
WEIGHT 1
WHERE
    st = s0
THEN
    st := {s1 @ 0.5 , s2 @ 0.5 }
END

```

As seen in the event, the fifty-fifty probability of the coin toss is represented with a probabilistic assignment. For transitions that precede a terminating state, they are represented by changing the state to s_7 , and assigning to the dice the respective value. For example, the transitions that branch out of the fourth state are represented in Event-B as:

```

EVENT State4Trans
WEIGHT 1
WHERE
    st = s4
THEN
    st := s7
    dice := {2 @ 0.5 , 3 @ 0.5 }
END

```

As mentioned before, to differentiate between each one of the terminating states, the variable *dice* is used, e.g. when the dice is equal to 5, then the state of the system is $st = s_7$, $dice = 5$, and if the dice is equal to 3 then the state of the system is $st = s_7$, $dice = 3$. Finally, to initialize the system the values s_0 and 0 are assigned to the variables *st* and *dice* respectively.

```

INITIALISATION
    st := s0
    dice := 0

```

The property that wants to be verified for this program is the probability of reaching a terminating state where the value of $dice = k$, where $k = 1, 2, \dots, 6$. If the model is correct, then the probability is $P(dice = k) = \frac{1}{6}$ for all k .

Using the encoder, the PMAude specification is obtained by repeating the process defined in Chapter 3. The file that contains this specification can be found in the repository with the filename `DiceProgram1.maude`. In order to define the user observations `rval`, an equation needs to be added that obtains the value of the dice variable. Therefore, for each one of the possible values of the dice (1 to 6) an equation is added that returns true (represented as 1.0 since `rval` return float numbers) if the dice has that specific value. For example, to verify that the dice has the value 1, the following equation is added to the PMAude specification:

```

    --- User Defined Observations
eq val("obs1", {Conf < MNAME:Machine |
    variables:('st |-> st , 'dice |-> dice) >}
    {gt | SL})
    = toFloat(((dice) =b (val(elt(1)))))) .

```

Hence, when the `s.rval("obs1")` is called in the MultiQuaTEX file, it will return 1.0 if the value of the dice is 1, and 0.0 otherwise. Moreover, for every encoded model, the encoder will also generate inside the specification two equations that can be used to define `rval` observations, regarding the terminating state of the model:

```

eq val("isMax", {Conf} {gt | SL}) = if (gt >= MAX-STEPS)
    then 1.0
    else 0.0 fi .

eq val("deadlock", {Conf < events : Events | state: (LEv) >}
    {gt | SL}) = if (not-unknown(LEv) and
    not(one-firable(LEv)))
    then 1.0
    else 0.0 fi .

```

The first equation returns 1.0 (true) if the maximum number of transitions have been executed. Each transition corresponds to the execution of the *chooseEvt* rule, and the number that defines the maximum number of transitions is specified as a constant named as `MAX-STEPS` in the specification. By default it is set to 10000, but it can be modified directly in the PMAude specification. Inside the specification, this number is used to bound the number of transitions of the PMAude model, and terminating its execution when the number is reached. It is important to set the `MAX-STEPS` accordingly to the model's specification, since setting this value to a low value might stop the simulation process before reaching a terminating state.

The second equation returns 1.0 if the model has reached a deadlock, i.e. none of the guards of the translated events have been satisfied. To do this, the equation `not-unknown` (it verifies that all the states have a state different from unknown) and `one-firable` (it verifies if there is at least one event with satisfied guards) are used. It is important to understand correctly these two equations, since they will be used to define the terminating condition of most of the PMAude specifications that result from the translation.

For the verification of the model, the MultiQuaTEX formula that is used to verify the model is:

```

PDice1(n) = if ((s.rval("isMax") == 1.0) || (s.rval("deadlock") == 1.0))
    then s.rval(n) else # PDice1(n) fi ;

eval E[ PDice1("obs1") ] ;

```

```

eval E[ PDice1("obs2") ] ;
eval E[ PDice1("obs3") ] ;
eval E[ PDice1("obs4") ] ;
eval E[ PDice1("obs5") ] ;
eval E[ PDice1("obs6") ] ;

```

When a terminating state is reached, i.e. the simulation has reached the maximum number of transitions or the simulation has reached a deadlock state, then the formula returns the value of the observation `s.rval(n)` where `n` is a parameter of the formula, that is going to be replaced in each one of the evaluation calls with `"obs1"`, `"obs2"`... or `"obs6"`. Using this formula, and the parameters $\alpha = 0.01$, $\delta = 0.01$ and $bs = 28$, the results of the simulation using MultiVeStA are:

Property	ObtainedValue	Variance	CI
PDice1(obs1)	0.169194084235345	0.140571212336999	0.00999772484533201
PDice1(obs2)	0.165127336320909	0.137864066309953	0.00999898248710578
PDice1(obs3)	0.166322650733297	0.138663192561158	0.00999737034957979
PDice1(obs4)	0.164898271712973	0.137710597576251	0.00999724079076279
PDice1(obs5)	0.166095890410959	0.138511810325858	0.00999571303811207
PDice1(obs6)	0.167870619946092	0.139693840237627	0.00999651791545913

Results for the MultiQuaTEx expression (from left to right)




Figure 5.2: Graph of the simulation results of the first dice program

The number of simulations performed to obtain the results were 37324, and the time it took to run them was 2521.757 seconds (42 minutes). From this simulation, it is safe to say that the obtained results are close to the expected real value of $\frac{1}{6}$.

The second dice program corresponds to the same scenario, but considering two dice throws, i.e. the same transition system but simulated twice. This time, the property that wants to be verified is the probability of obtaining k as the sum of the results of both dice, where $k = 2, 3, 4, \dots, 12$. The expected probability for each one of the possible sums of two dice is:

k	Probability
2	1/36
3	1/18
4	3/36
5	1/9
6	5/36
7	1/6
8	5/36
9	1/9
10	3/36
11	1/18
12	1/36

To specify the model, one approach would be to add new variables *state2*, *dice2*, and duplicate the events specified in the previous dice program to change the new variables. Event though implementing the Event-B model in this way would work, for this model the optimized version proposed in [27] will be used. This version consists of the same principle: multiple states and coin tosses as transitions, until reaching a terminating state, i.e. the sum of two dices. The graph that represents this model is:




Figure 5.3: States and transitions of the two dice model, taken from [28]

Each one of the nodes in Figure 5.3 represents a state in the probabilistic Event-B model. Therefore, the new context specifies a deferred set with 33 states, and an extra 34th state to specify a terminating state (similar to state s_7 in the previous model).

```
CONTEXT ctxDiceProgram2
SETS
    STATES : { s0, s1, ... , s33, s34 }
CONSTANTS
END
```

For the variables, and the initialization of the machine, the Event-B specification is identical. Finally, for the events of the model the principle is the same: For each one the transitions use a probabilistic assignment to symbolize the fifty-fifty chance in the system transitions. The resulting probabilistic Event-B model and the encoded version in PMAUDE, can be consulted in the `DiceProgram2.b` and `DiceProgram2.maude` files respectively. The equations that define the user observations are also defined in the same manner:

```
eq val("obs1", {Conf < MNAME : Machine |
                variables: ('st |-> st , 'diceSum |-> diceSum) >}
        {gt | SL} ) = toFloat(((diceSum) =b (val(elt(2)))))) .
```

In this case "obs1" references the case where $k = 2$, "obs2" references the case $k = 3$, and so on until "obs11". The MultiQuaTEX formula used to verify the model is also very similar to the previous one:

```

PDice2(n) = if ((s.rval("isMax") == 1.0) || (s.rval("deadlock") == 1.0))
    then s.rval(n) else # PDice2(n) fi ;

eval E[ PDice2("obs1") ] ;
eval E[ PDice2("obs2") ] ;
eval E[ PDice2("obs3") ] ;
eval E[ PDice2("obs4") ] ;
eval E[ PDice2("obs5") ] ;
eval E[ PDice2("obs6") ] ;
eval E[ PDice2("obs7") ] ;
eval E[ PDice2("obs8") ] ;
eval E[ PDice2("obs9") ] ;
eval E[ PDice2("obs10") ] ;
eval E[ PDice2("obs11") ] ;

```

Using this formula, and the parameters $\alpha = 0.01$, $\delta = 0.01$ and $bs = 100$, the results of the simulation using MultiVeStA are:

Property	ObtainedValue	Variance	CI
PDice2(obs1)	0.03	0.0291037312475958	0.00995116917577923
PDice2(obs2)	0.0510077519379845	0.0484097138712153	0.00997972279089514
PDice2(obs3)	0.0853365384615385	0.0780579664517895	0.00997985024064457
PDice2(obs4)	0.114200743494424	0.101162694374703	0.00999035979240436
PDice2(obs5)	0.138710691823899	0.119473792835145	0.00998550057004364
PDice2(obs6)	0.164328767123288	0.137328585846037	0.00999266014168248
PDice2(obs7)	0.135176848874598	0.116907827497064	0.00998823325270086
PDice2(obs8)	0.110306513409962	0.0981427467677965	0.0099897800415653
PDice2(obs9)	0.0811616161616162	0.0745781747981354	0.00999816628115168
PDice2(obs10)	0.0551798561151079	0.0521387905863524	0.00997746359029961
PDice2(obs11)	0.0282191780821918	0.0274266131408506	0.0099855441351178




Figure 5.4: Graph of the simulation results of the second dice program

In total, the number of simulations performed to obtain the results were 36500, and the time it took to run them was 4583.059 seconds (76 minutes). In the end, the results of the simulation are very close to the expected probability for each one of the possible values of the sum of the two dice.

5.2 Bounded Re-transmission Protocol

The bounded re-transmission protocol is based on the sixth refinement of the file transfer protocol in Chapter 6 of Abrial's book [4]. In this occasion, a short explanation of the model will be given to understand the general intuition behind its behavior. The reader can refer to the explanation given in the book, or the model specification in the file `b-retrans-5.b` in the repository for further details.

The file transfer protocol consists of a sender and a receiver, where the sender shares to the receiver a file. As seen in Figure 5.5, there are two channels to ensure the communication between the sender and the receiver: the first one is the *data channel*, used by the sender to transfer the file to the receiver, and the second one is the *acknowledge channel*, used by the receiver to inform to the sender that the information that it has send, has already been received by the receiver.




Figure 5.5: Interaction between sender and receiver, taken from [4]

The file can be considered as an array of values. Therefore, sending data to the receiver consists of sending one by one, through the data channel, the elements of the array as seen in Figure 5.6




Figure 5.6: File transmission process from the sender to the receiver, taken from [4]

The protocol is completed when all the elements from the file have been transferred to the receiver, therefore reaching the success state. If the complete process is represented as a series of steps, the result is:

1. Initialize the system, i.e. initialize the file in the senders memory and other necessary variables for the transmission process.
2. The sender sends the first element of the file.
3. The receiver receives the sent element and returns to the sender the acknowledge signal.

4. The sender receives the acknowledge signal.
5. Steps 2, 3 and 4 are repeated with the following element, until sending all the elements of the file to the receiver. In that case, the system enters the success state, and the procedure is finished.

The complete process can be visualized in Figure 5.7:




Figure 5.7: Complete file transmission process

Now, let's consider a model where both the data and acknowledge channel are unreliable, i.e. there exists the possibility of data loss when the file is sent, or when the acknowledgment message is sent. When this occurs, the protocol must retry to send the lost information. However, including a retry procedure can cause infinite loops in the system, since there exists a path in the model's transition where the system can send, fail and retry infinitely. To avoid this, a new constant is included in the system, named *MAX*, that specifies the maximum number of retries that the protocol can make. If the maximum number of retries is exceeded then the protocol reaches the failure state, meaning that the file was not completely sent to the receiver. The complete process can be viewed in Figure 5.8:




Figure 5.8: File transmission process with unreliable channels

In order to assign probabilities to the previously explained model, every time the sender or the receiver send information to one another, there is a 50% chance of failure. Inside the `b-retrans-5.b` file, this behavior can be specified by assigning the same weight to the events that specify the action of sending successfully the message, and the events that specify the failure in the communication channels. Hence, the weight assigned to all the events is 1.

Given this probabilistic model, the property that wants to be verified using MultiVeStA is the probability of reaching the success state, using the maximum number of retries MAX , as a parameter of the model. Thus, using the encoder, the `b-retrans-5.b` model was translated into PMAude. The user defined observations where:

- “**obs1**”: returns 1.0 if the state of the system is failed, and 0.0 otherwise.
- “**obs2**”: returns 1.0 if the state of the system is success, and 0.0 otherwise.

And the MultiQuaTEx formula used to verify the model was:

```

PRetrans5(n) = if ((s.rval("deadlock") == 1.0) || (s.rval("isMax") == 1.0))
                then s.rval(n) else # PRetrans5(n) fi ;

eval E[ PRetrans5("obs1") ] ;
  
```

```
eval E[ PReTrans5("obs2") ] ;
```

It states that when the system reaches a terminating state, i.e. reaching the failure or success state, since both of these states mean that the system enters a deadlock, then the formula verifies if the state of the system is successful or failed. Using this formula, parameters $\alpha = 0.01, \delta = 0.01, bs = 100$, a fixed size for the file $N = 100$, and multiple values for the maximum number of retries MAX , the results of the simulation are:

File size	MAX	Simulations	Time in seconds	Property	ObtainedValue	Variance	CI
100	0	100	7.96	PReTrans5(obs1)	1	0	0
				PReTrans5(obs2)	0	0	0
100	5	100	19.633	PReTrans5(obs1)	1	0	0
				PReTrans5(obs2)	0	0	0
100	10	4200	4695.782	PReTrans5(obs1)	0.984285714285714	0.0154710305174701	0.0098873988006215
				PReTrans5(obs2)	0.0154761904761905	0.0152403066489754	0.00981339506242592
100	15	13200	49320.0	PReTrans5(obs1)	0.636742424242424	0.231319033581516	0.0215658109731058
				PReTrans5(obs2)	0.359772727272727	0.230353763026125	0.0215207679775556
100	20	8900	51120.0	PReTrans5(obs1)	0.212111111111111	0.167138558605277	0.0222005711076664
				PReTrans5(obs2)	0.786111111111111	0.168159116445037	0.0222682469512274
100	25	7700	49560.0	PReTrans5(obs1)	0.0507792207792208	0.0482069521594135	0.0128901078154959
				PReTrans5(obs2)	0.949090909090909	0.0483236311681564	0.0129056978494018
100	30	2800	19700.462	PReTrans5(obs1)	0.0103571428571429	0.0102535344255602	0.00985836415788304
				PReTrans5(obs2)	0.989642857142857	0.0102535344255602	0.00985836415788304




Figure 5.9: Graph of success and failure probability of the bounded re-transmission protocol

As seen in the previous Table and the graph in Figure 5.9, the probability of success is directly proportional to the maximum number of retries. Conversely, the probability of failure is inversely proportional to the maximum number of retries. This is the expected behavior, since incrementing the maximum number of retries of the protocol should increase the probability that the file is sent completely. It is important to note, that not all of the simulations reached the desired confidence interval ($CI < 0.01$). The reason behind this, is that the time it was taking to reach the desired confidence interval was overly long, as seen

in the previous table. Hence, some of the simulations were stopped before reaching the desired confidence interval. Nevertheless, the obtained confidence interval for the stopped simulations is good enough (approximately $CI < 0.023$) to approximate the probability of reaching a success or failure state.

5.3 Balance Property in Signed Frames

Positive negative logic or *PNL* is a modal logic introduced in [29, 30], used to define properties over a specific class of network. For the moment, this section will only focus on the *signed frame* structure and a dynamic model that modifies signed frames. The reader is encouraged to read the cited articles to understand the syntax, semantics and extension of PNL. In these networks the nodes represent agents, and the connections or edges between them represent if two agents share the same or contrary opinion of a particular topic. Formally speaking, a network is represented as a signed frame of the form $\mathbb{F} = \langle A, R^+, R^- \rangle$, where A is a set of agents, and R^+, R^- are symmetric binary relations from A to A . For any agent $a, b \in A$, if $(a, b) \in R^+$ then it means that agents a and b share the same opinion. Conversely, if $(a, b) \in R^-$, then a and b have different opinions. For example, lets consider the signed frame:

$$\mathbb{F} = \langle \{a, b, c, d\}, \{(a, c), (b, d)\}, \{(a, b), (a, d), (b, c)\} \rangle$$

Graphically, this signed frame is represented by the graph:




Figure 5.10: Graph that represents the signed frame \mathbb{F} , taken from [29]

One of the important properties that define these type of graph is the balance property. In short, a signed frame \mathbb{F} is said to have the balance property, if $\forall a, b, c \in A$:

- if aR^+b and bR^+c , or aR^-b and bR^-c , then aR^+c and
- if aR^+b and bR^-c , or aR^-b and bR^+c , then aR^-c .

The balance property is important since it allows to define group polarization in networks: when a network has the balance property, it is possible divide the set A in two subsets S and $A \setminus S$, where all the agents in the same subset share the same opinion, and agents from different subset have different opinion. In more detail, if aR^+b then $a, b \in S$ or $a, b \in A \setminus S$. Moreover, if aR^-b then $a \in S$ and $b \in A \setminus S$, or $b \in S$ and $a \in A \setminus S$. As an example, the signed frame in figure 5.10 has the balance property, and can be divided in two opposing groups X and Y .

One of the extensions proposed to PNL in the article [29], are the modalities $\langle \bigwedge + \rangle$ and $\langle \bigwedge - \rangle$, which can be explained as adding a positive and negative link somewhere in the network. One way to represent the previously explained behavior, is with a dynamic system that takes an initial signed frame, and non-deterministically adds positive and negative links until reaching a terminating state, i.e. all the links between the nodes of the graph have been added.




Figure 5.11: Initial and possible terminating state of a simulation of the dynamic system.

To exemplify, if the graph in the left side of Figure 5.11 is considered as the initial state of the system, then one of the possible outcomes of the simulation, after adding non-deterministically positive and negative links, is the graph in the right side of Figure 5.11. The idea is then to elaborate a probabilistic Event-B model that has the same behavior as described before. The probability of the system lies on the choice of adding a positive or negative link. In this case, the probability for both actions will be fifty percent. Therefore, the context of the model would contain the set of all the agents in the signed frame. For example, if $A = \{a, b, c\}$ then the context would be:

```
CONTEXT ctxPNL
SETS
  AGENTS : { a, b, c } # nodes of the graph #
CONSTANTS
END
```

For the machine 3 variables will be used: two relations that represent the relations R^+ and R^- of the signed frame, and an extra variable that contains all the possible edges of the signed frame, which will remain constant throughout the complete simulation and will be used to identify the missing edges to add to the graph.

```

MACHINE PNL
  SEES ctxPNL

  VARIABLES
    AgentsComb # set of all possible edges #
    Rpositive # relation that represents positive edges in graph #
    Rnegative # relation that represents negative edges in graph #

  INVARIANTS
    Rpositive : POW ( AGENTS ** AGENTS )
    Rnegative : POW ( AGENTS ** AGENTS )
    AgentsComb : POW ( AGENTS ** AGENTS )

```

The action of adding positive and negative edges to the graph is represented with two events that have the same weight, thus giving to each one of the events a fifty percent probability of occurring.

```

EVENT addPositiveEdge
WEIGHT 1
ANY
  edge <: (AgentsComb \ Rpositive) \ Rnegative
WHERE
  True
THEN
  Rpositive := Rpositive \s/ edge
END

EVENT addNegativeEdge
WEIGHT 1
ANY
  edge <: (AgentsComb \ Rpositive) \ Rnegative
WHERE
  True
THEN
  Rnegative := Rnegative \s/ edge
END

```

Where $<:$ is the ϵ symbol in Event-B, and $\backslash s/$ symbolizes union between sets. The initialization event depends of the initial configuration of the signed frame. For example, if the signed frame has the form of the graph on the right of figure 5.11, the initialization

event would be:

INITIALISATION

```

AgentsComb := { a |-> b, a |-> c, a |-> d,
                b |-> c, b |-> d,
                c |-> d }
Rpositive := {a |-> d}
Rnegative := {a |-> b}

```

Based on this probabilistic Event-B model, the property that wants to be verified is: given an initial configuration for a signed frame, what is the probability of reaching a terminating state where the signed frame has the balance property. To complete the task, three different experiments with three signed frames will be run using the encoder and MultiVeStA. The first experiment corresponds to the following signed frame:




Figure 5.12: Signed frame of the first experiment

In total, there are four out of eight possible configurations, where the resulting signed frame is balanced.

(a,b)	(a,c)	(b,c)	Balanced
+	+	+	yes
-	+	+	no
+	-	+	no
+	+	-	no
-	-	+	yes
-	+	-	yes
+	-	-	yes
-	-	-	no
			50%

It is then expected that the results obtained by the MultiQuaTEx formula is near $\frac{1}{2}$. After translating the probabilistic Event-B model to a Maude specification, a user defined

equation is added to the specification. The equation `Balanced` takes as input the current state of the signed frame, i.e. the value of relations R^+ and R^- , and checks if the signed frame is balanced. If it is balanced, then it returns 1.0 and 0.0 otherwise. To verify that the signed frame is balanced, the equation verifies if all the triangles in the signed frame satisfy the balance property. For more detail, the reader can refer to the `PNL1.maude` file for more information on the implementation of the equation. Lastly, the MultiQuaTEx formula used to verify the property is defined as follows:

```
PPNL(n) = if ((s.rval("isMax") == 1.0) || (s.rval("deadlock") == 1.0))
            then s.rval(n) else # PPNL(n) fi ;

eval E[ PPNL("balanced") ] ;
```

It states that when a terminating states is reached, then return the value of evaluating the `Balanced` equation over the last state. Using this formula, and the parameters $\alpha = 0.01$, $\delta = 0.01$ and $bs = 100$, the results of the simulation using MultiVeStA where:

Property	Time in seconds	Simulations	ObtainedValue	Variance	CI
PPNL(balanced)	2735.93	46400	0.497948164146868	0.250001189563359	0.0119709224484389

As seen in the table, the obtained value for the formula is within the expected range of the real value. It is worth noting that the desired confidence interval with $\delta = 0.01$ was not reached since in the last MultiVeStA cycle, the returned value for the confidence interval was NaN, i.e. not a number. For the time being, the source of this behavior is unclear (although it seems to be related with an internal error of the MultiVeStA tool), but with the previously obtained values, it is possible to form an idea on the expected value for the query. The other two experiments correspond to the following signed frames:




Figure 5.13: Signed frames of experiment 2 (left) and experiment 3 (right)

For the experiment 2 (left side of Figure 5.13), the chances of reaching a terminating state that is balanced are two out of eight (25% chance), and for experiment 3 the probability is

0%, since the initial configuration already includes a triangle that is not balanced, which is highlighted in red. The MultiQuaTEx query used for both experiments is the same one as experiment 1, and the obtained results with parameters $\alpha = 0.01$, $\delta = 0.01$ and $bs = 100$ are:

Experiment	Time in seconds	Simulations	ObtainedValue	Variance	CI
1	2639.935	46400	0.254341252699784	0.189655876114114	0.010426528417539
2	5.631	100	0	0	0

The results obtained in the simulations are in accordance with the real expected value of the queries. For the experiment 2, the NaN value was also obtained before reaching the desired confidence interval, therefore the estimation of the expected value of the query was done with the value obtained in the previous batch of simulations. Still, the confidence interval is good enough for an approximation of the expected value of the query.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

This work provided a functional implementation that integrates the probabilistic Event-B to PMaude translation process, known as EventB2Maude, with the statistical model checking tool MultiVeStA, documented in Chapter 4. On top of that, this same chapter contains a detailed explanation of the observed behavior and functionality of the MultiVeStA tool, which can serve as a starting point for future integrations of PMaude models with MultiVeStA.

Moreover, as part of this work, the necessary background to understand the mentioned encoding process was covered and synthesized in the preliminaries chapter. Additionally, the encoding was also explained and documented in Chapter 3, detailing further the explanation given in [17]. Therefore, this work may serve as an introductory and self-contained guide, to understand the theoretical background and the technicalities of the previously mentioned article.

Lastly, by implementing different case studies, it was possible to demonstrate the functionality of MultiVeStA and the EventB2Maude tool, by obtaining simulation results that match the real expected values of the MultiQuaTEx queries. Unfortunately, it is important to note that there exist some difficulties with the current state of the integration:

- As the reader might have noticed in the verification results using the MultiVeStA tool, the time to reach the desired confidence interval might take too long, when the required confidence interval determined by the δ parameter is difficult to obtain. For example, a value of $\delta = 0.01$ proved to be challenging in terms of time for some of the simulations, specially for the bounded re-transmission protocol. For the moment, we do not have a concrete explanation for the large amount of time it takes to verify this particular model, but it seems to be related to the large number of events that are executed in each simulation.
- Related with the previous point, if more decimal precision is needed for the obtained value of the MultiQuaTEx query, then the δ parameter must be decreased. Thus,

having a decimal precision for more than three decimal places implies a $\delta < 0.01$, which translates into a large amount of simulation time in the current condition of the tool, using only one thread for execution, i.e. no parallelism, and the value $\alpha = 0.01$.

- For the time being, there is not a satisfactory answer that explains why in some cases the confidence interval reaches the NaN value and stops the simulations. Nevertheless, the answer for the specific query can be obtained from the result of the previous batch of simulations.

Regarding future work, there are multiple things that can be done:

- Investigate and understand why in some of the simulations the value of the confidence interval reaches the NaN value.
- Find ways to reduce the overall simulation time when the model has many system transitions or the value for the confidence interval is difficult to reach, due to the δ parameter.
- Implement a more user friendly user interface that allows to make translations of probabilistic Event-B models and verification with MultiVeStA with more ease.
- Extend the EventB2Maude tool to allow the specification of more elements of the Event-B language, like the machine invariants or context axioms, defined with first order logic.
- Implement the EventB2Maude tool as a functional Rodin plug in.
- Explore how the model checking tool in Maude can be used to check the deterministic part of the translated Event-B models.
- Use MultiVeStA's option for using parallelism to run simulations on multiple threads, and verify if the simulation time is substantially reduced.

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